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DISEASE-BRANDING AND DRUG-MONGERING:
COULD PHARMACEUTICAL INDUSTRY PROMOTIONAL
PRACTICES RESULT IN TORT LIABILITY?
Jason S. Cetel

I.



INTRODUCTION

Imagine a forty-five-year-old woman who has been happily married
for fifteen years presenting to her physician with complaints of infrequent
1
sexual thoughts and fantasies. After a history and physical examination,
2
the physician diagnoses her as having low sexual desire. But does she
have an actual disease? A few decades ago, this woman would not have
3
had a recognizable disease, and there was no official diagnosis. Today,
she could be diagnosed with some form of Female Sexual Dysfunction
4
5
(FSD) or Hypoactive Sexual Desire Disorder (HSDD). The evolution of
these symptoms into a recognizable disease occurred through a process of



J.D. Candidate, May 2012, Seton Hall University School of Law; B.A., 2009, Vassar
College. Thanks to my advisors Professors Jordan Paradise and Kate Greenwood, my
comment editor Marissa Litwin, and Amanda Brill for their constructive comments, invaluable advice, and support.
1
See Rosemary Basson, Sexual Desire and Arousal Disorders in Women, 354 NEW
ENG. J. MED. 1497, 1497 (2006).
2
Id.
3
See Sexual Dysfunction—Sexual Desire Disorders, Sexual Arousal Disorders, Orgasm Disorders, Sexual Pain Disorders, Sex Therapy, JRANK: MARRIAGE AND FAM.
ENCYCLOPEDIA, http://family.jrank.org/pages/1508/Sexual-Dysfunction.html (last visited
Feb. 4, 2012) (“Psychosexual disorders were listed for the first time in 1980 in the third edition of the American Psychiatric Association’s Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental
Disorders (DSM-III), a handbook used by almost all mental health professionals.”). Compare AM. PSYCHIATRIC ASS’N., DIAGNOSTIC AND STATISTICAL MANUAL OF MENTAL
DISORDERS (2d ed., 1968), and AM. PSYCHIATRIC ASS’N., DIAGNOSTIC AND STATISTICAL
MANUAL OF MENTAL DISORDERS (3d ed., 1980), with AM. PSYCHIATRIC ASS’N., DIAGNOSTIC
AND STATISTICAL MANUAL OF MENTAL DISORDERS 293 (3d rev. ed., 1987) (containing Hypoactive Sexual Desire Disorder, Diagnostic Code 302.71), and AM. PSYCHIATRIC ASS’N.,
DIAGNOSTIC AND STATISTICAL MANUAL OF MENTAL DISORDERS 541 (4th ed., text rev., 2000)
[hereinafter DSM-IV-TR, 2000] (same).
4
Ray Moynihan, The Marketing of a Disease: Female Sexual Dysfunction, 330 BRIT.
MED. J. 192, 192 (2005),
available
at
http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC545000/pdf/
bmj33000192.pdf.
5
Id.; see also DSM-IV-TR, 2000, supra note 3, at 541; Basson, supra note 1, at 1498
tbl.2.
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social construction and medicalization. It is called disease-branding, and
6
HSDD provides a quintessential example of this practice.
Disease-branding is the pharmaceutical advertising practice of transforming symptoms into disease-states and coining new clinical names to
7
identify them. This practice legitimizes diseases in the eyes of consumer8
patients as a pretext to push drug treatments on them. The concept of dis9
ease-branding has gained heightened attention in the media. In October
6

See Andrew Moseman, Skeptics of “Female Viagra” Say Drug Co’s Are “Disease
Branding,”
80BEATS
(June
18,
2010,
9:59
AM),
http://blogs.discovermagazine.com/80beats/2010/06/18/skeptics-of-female-viagra-say-drugcos-are-disease-branding/. The creation of “Metabolic Syndrome” provides another example of disease branding:
Most people may not have heard of metabolic syndrome, but that is likely to
change. Once known mysteriously as Syndrome X, the condition, a precursor
to heart disease and type 2 diabetes, is about to be transformed into a household name by the US pharmaceutical industry and its partners in the medical
profession. A society dedicated to addressing the condition has been organized, a journal has been started, and an education campaign launched. Patients are already being tested for metabolic syndrome. As the trade publication Pharmaceutical Executive said in its January 2004 issue: “A new disease
is being born.”
Howard Wolinsky, Disease Mongering and Drug Marketing: Does the Pharmaceutical Industry Manufacture Diseases as Well as Drugs?, 6 EUR. MOLECULAR BIOLOGY ORG. REP.
612, 612 (2005) (emphasis added) (internal citation omitted), available at
http://www.nature.com/embor/journal/v6/n7/pdf/7400476.pdf.
7
Ray Moynihan, The Merging of Marketing and Medical Science, ABC NEWS ONLINE
(Aug. 30, 2010), http://www.abc.net.au/unleashed/stories/s2996546.htm. See generally
Anne Landman, Branding Diseases to Sell Cures, PR WATCH BLOG (Oct. 12, 2010, 12:44
PM), http://www.prwatch.org/node/9529 (“Once people are convinced they have a new
condition, they will seek treatment on their own, and new drugs will sell themselves.”);
Vince
Parry,
Branding
Disease,
PHARM.
EXEC.
(Oct.
15,
2007),
http://pharmexec.findpharma.com/pharmexec/article/articleDetail.jsp?id=465561&pageID=
1&sk=&date=.
8
See Wolinsky, supra note 6, at 612.
9
See, e.g., Elizabeth Mari, New Buzzword of 2010: “Disease Branding,” BEYOND MY
TWO CENTS (Oct. 14, 2010), http://www.beyondmytwocents.com/new-buzzword-of-2010disease-branding/; Ben Schott, Disease Branding, SCHOTT’S VOCAB (Oct. 18, 2010, 1:30
PM), http://schott.blogs.nytimes.com/2010/10/18/disease-branding/. Comedians and pundits
in the popular media have also observed this phenomenon. See, e.g., Bill Maher-AntiPharma Rant, YOUTUBE (Sept. 30, 2007), http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=rHXXTCcIVg&feature=related.
Because you see the government isn’t your nanny, they’re your dealer. And
they subsidize illness in America. They have to; there’s too much money in
it. You see, there’s no money in healthy people. And there’s no money in
dead people. The money is in the middle. People who are alive, sort of. But
with one or more chronic conditions that puts them in need of Celebrex, or
Nasonex, or Valtrex, or Lunesta. . . . [There are emerging epidemics and] a
long list of ailments, which used to be rare and have now been mainstreamed.
Id. Bill Maher is correct that there is money in drug-mongering because treating chronic
conditions is much more profitable than curing them. The suggestion that the FDA, however, as the representative agency of the government, implicitly legitimizes the mainstreaming
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2010, the New York Times’ resident lexicographer, blogging about the recent coinage of “disease-branding,” defined it as the practice of
10
“[h]yping the profile of a medical condition in order to sell its treatment.”
In its more extreme form, critics have pejoratively characterized diseasebranding as the practice of “trying to convince essentially well people that
11
they are sick, or slightly sick people that they are very ill.”
Diseasebranding has even been referred to as “the most insidious of the various
12
forms that medical advertising . . . and medical diagnosis can take.”
When pharmaceutical companies attempt to push drug treatments on
patients through disease-branding strategies such as direct-to-consumer
(DTC) advertising, they are engaging in a practice called “drug13
mongering.” Drug-mongering is inextricably linked to disease-branding:
it refers to the practice of persuading consumers that they are afflicted with
the branded disease and thus require the advertised drug treatment. Bioethicist Professor Dr. Carl Elliot explains this as a two-part process in which
14
drug companies sell their drugs by selling the diseases they treat. Essentially, branding a disease “is to shape its public perception in order to make
15
it more palatable to potential patients.” Once a disease is successfully
branded, drug companies engage in drug-mongering by persuading consumer-patients that they need to use the company’s drugs to treat the dis16
ease. The confluence of disease-branding and drug-mongering is the essence of pharmaceutical promotional practices, and these promotional
practices provide the context and analytical framework for this Comment.
The development of HSDD demonstrates a disease-branding and
17
drug-mongering strategy. According to Ray Moynihan, an investigative
of ailments through its approval process misconstrues the FDA’s mandate, which is to approve drugs as safe and effective for their intended use, not to determine what the intended
use is or should be. See infra Part II.B.
10
Schott, supra note 9.
11
Wolinsky, supra note 6, at 612 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).
12
Id.
13
Although the term “drug-mongering” does not seem to be used in the literature—
“disease-mongering” is the preferred terminology—this Comment uses the concepts of
“disease-branding” and “drug-mongering” as separate practices that are intimately related,
are complementary, and act synergistically for pharmaceutical promotional practices to be
effective.
14
Carl Elliott, How to Brand a Disease—and Sell a Cure, CNN.COM (Oct. 11, 2010,
2:07
PM),
http://www.cnn.com/2010/OPINION/10/11/elliott.branding.disease/
index.html?iref=allsearch.
15
Id.
16
Id. (“Once a branded disease has achieved a degree of cultural legitimacy, there is no
need to convince anyone that a drug to treat it is necessary. It will come to him as his own
idea.”).
17
Moseman, supra note 6 (“This is really a classic case of disease branding. . . . The
messages are aimed at medicalizing normal conditions, and also preying on the insecurity of
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journalist and vocal opponent of pharmaceutical promotional practices,
drug companies have diligently tried to convince women that they need a
18
drug to treat low libido. He notes that pharmaceutical companies “have
helped create the measurement and diagnostic instruments to persuade
women that their sexual difficulties deserve a medical label and treat19
ment.”
Flibanserin is a drug that was developed to treat HSDD, and the drug
sponsor’s briefing document, prepared for the Food and Drug Administra20
tion’s (FDA) Reproductive Health Drugs Advisory Committee meeting
regarding flibanserin’s New Drug Application (NDA), reported positive
21
safety and efficacy data.
But the FDA’s Advisory Committee unani-

both the clinician and the patient.” (internal quotation marks and citation omitted)). Contra
Nancy Zielinski, Treatments Needed to Treat Female Sexual Dysfunction Experts Say,
EXAMINER.COM (Jan. 10, 2011, 11:12 AM), http://www.examiner.com/sexual-health-ingrand-rapids/treatments-needed-to-treat-female-sexual-dysfunction-expertssay?cid=parsely#parsely (noting that ninety percent of doctors surveyed accept the need for
an FDA-approved treatment).
18
Kathleen Blanchard, Female Sexual Dysfunction: Are Drug Companies Manufacturing a Disease?, EXAMINER.COM (Oct. 2, 2010, 2:45 PM), http://www.examiner.com/womens-health-in-national/female-sexual-dysfunction-are-drug-companies-manufacturing-adisease.
19
Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
20
An advisory committee is composed of outside scientific and medical experts as well
as industry, consumer, and patient representatives who provide the FDA with independent
advice on regulatory decisions. See Questions and Answers Regarding Advisory Committee
Membership,
FDA,
http://www.fda.gov/AdvisoryCommittees/
AboutAdvisoryCommittees/CommitteeMembership/ucm117646.htm (last visited Jan. 20,
2012); see also U.S. FOOD AND DRUG ADMIN., DRAFT GUIDANCE FOR THE PUBLIC AND FDA
STAFF ON CONVENING ADVISORY COMMITTEE MEETINGS 3 (2008), available at
http://www.fda.gov/downloads/RegulatoryInformation/Guidances/UCM125651.
pdf (“FDA’s advisory committees provide independent expert advice to the agency on a
range of complex scientific, technical, and policy issues. An advisory committee meeting
also provides a forum for a public hearing on important matters. Although advisory committees provide recommendations to FDA, FDA makes the final decisions.”).
21
BOEHRINGER INGELHEIM, FLIBANSERIN BRIEFING DOCUMENT 22 (2010), available at
http://www.fda.gov/downloads/AdvisoryCommittees/CommitteesMeetingMaterials/Drugs/
ReproductiveHealthDrugsAdvisoryCommittee/UCM215438.pdf.
Flibanserin therapy, at the recommended dosing regimen . . . resulted in statistically significant and clinically relevant improvements of the hallmark
symptoms of HSDD in premenopausal women based on patient-based assessments of sexual desire, sexual distress, sexual activity, sexual function,
and overall patient benefit. In general, flibanserin is well-tolerated as the
AEs reported during the development program were non-serious and mild in
severity. Currently, women face extremely limited options when seeking
help for HSDD. It is important that women suffering from HSDD and their
health care providers have an approved treatment option available to them.
As the first pharmacologic therapy for HSDD in premenopausal women, if
approved, Flibanserin would appreciably expand the HSDD treatment armamentarium and the choices available to women.
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22

mously rejected flibanserin, and the sponsor discontinued seeking ap23
proval before the FDA could take final regulatory action on the NDA.
Although HSDD has evolved into a recognized disease, its treatment has
failed to co-evolve—there are currently no FDA-approved pharmaceutical
24
options available to treat this condition.
Without a drug to sell, drug
companies are unable to engage in drug-mongering, but flibanserin still
25
remains one of the most recent attempts at disease-branding. Despite the

Id.; see also Press Release, Boehringer Ingelheim, Women with Hypoactive Sexual Desire
Disorder (HSDD) Report That Flibanserin Increased Their Sexual Desire and Reduced Associated
Distress
(May
19,
2010),
available
at
http://www.boehringeringelheim.com/news/news_releases/press_releases/2010/19_may_2010.html.
22
Emily P. Walker, Company Halts “Female Viagra” Development, MEDPAGE TODAY
(Oct. 12, 2010), http://www.medpagetoday.com/ProductAlert/Prescriptions/22697 (“The
committee also voted 11 to 0 that the company failed to demonstrate that the benefits of
flibanserin outweigh the risks, which include fainting, accidental injury, insomnia, and fatigue.”); see also Duff Wilson, Drug for Sexual Desire Disorder Opposed by Panel, N.Y.
TIMES, June 19, 2010, at B3; “Female Viagra” Falls Short, FDA Says, MSNBC.COM (June
16, 2010, 2:35 PM), http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/37727629/; David W. Freeman, “Female Viagra” a Flop, Says FDA Panel, CBS NEWS (June 17, 2010),
http://www.cbsnews.com/stories/2010/06/17/health/main6591413.shtml.
23
Press Release, Boehringer Ingelheim, Following Regulatory Feedback Boehringer
Ingelheim Decides to Discontinue Flibanserin Development (Oct. 8, 2010), available at
http://www.boehringeringelheim.com/news/news_releases/press_releases/2010/08_october_2010_fliba.html.
Boehringer Ingelheim announced today the decision to discontinue the development of its investigational compound flibanserin for the treatment of
Hypoactive Sexual Desire Disorder (HSDD). The company continues to believe in the value that flibanserin would have for women suffering with
HSDD, a significant and recognized medical condition which impacts the
lives of many women around the world.
Id.; Boehringer Pulls the Plug on “Pink Viagra,” REUTERS (Oct. 8, 2010, 11:55 AM),
http://www.reuters.com/article/2010/10/08/us-boehringer-flibanserinidUSTRE6970TN20101008.
24
Jennifer Corbett Dooren, FDA Questions Safety of “Female Viagra,” WALL ST. J.,
June 17, 2010, at D2 [hereinafter Dooren, FDA Questions]; Jennifer Corbett Dooren, Panel
Rejects “Pink Viagra” to Boost Female Libido, WALL ST. J (June 18, 2010, 5:50 PM),
http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052748704122904575315140487376022.html; cf.
Basson, supra note 1, at 1502–03 tbl.4 (noting the absence of FDA-approved medications,
but the possibility of off-label uses). In a hypothetical case study of a woman with low
sexual desire, Dr. Basson stated that
[o]n the basis of clinical experience and limited data on outcomes, I would
recommend a combination of cognitive behavioral therapy and sex therapy . .
. . Any apparent interpersonal problems should be addressed before further
sexual therapy is pursued. At the present time, I would not recommend any
pharmacologic therapy, pending the availability of more (and longer-term)
data in support of such treatment.
Id. at 1504–05.
25
See Moseman, supra note 6; Press Release, BioSante Pharmaceuticals Reports Positive LibiGel® Safety Data Review for Phase III Program (Feb. 9, 2012), available at
http://www.biosantepharma.com/News-Releases.php?ID=020912 (describing LibiGel as a
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lack of an FDA-approved drug to treat HSDD, the controversy surrounding
26
the branding of this disease remains. Annemarie Jutel, a medical sociologist, suggests that
[i]n a society which portrays female hypersexuality as desirable, and
where women’s tumultuous lives don’t usually result in perfectly timed
and balanced sexual urges, it hasn’t been hard to describe low libido as
abnormal in order to sell an expensive cure . . . . The problem is the
hidden commercial interests behind the science . . . . Sexuality is a
complex expression of social, cultural, psychological, and physiological factors and many of us struggle with it, without being “sick.” Don’t
27
let the pharmaceutical industry tell you otherwise.

Commenting on the controversy surrounding the definition of HSDD,
Psychiatry Professor Dr. Ronald Pies notes that “in weighing this spectrum
of divergent views, it’s clear that much turns on our philosophical understanding of terms such as ‘disease,’ ‘disorder,’ ‘dysfunction,’ and ‘medical
28
condition.’” The controversy essentially encompasses the cultural, social,
medical, and (in this Comment) legal significance of disease-branding and
drug-mongering—their impact on regulatory decision-making, interaction
with statutory rules, and other potential legal ramifications.
Disease-branding and drug-mongering are the pharmaceutical promotional practices of “selling sickness” by widening the boundaries of diag29
nosable illnesses in order to expand the market for drug treatments. They
are “a process that encourages the conversion of socially created anxiety

drug “in development for the treatment of female sexual dysfunction (FSD), specifically,
hypoactive sexual desire disorder (HSDD) in menopausal women.”).
26
See, e.g., Moynihan, supra note 4; Leonore Tiefer, Female Sexual Dysfunction: A
Case Study of Disease Mongering and Activist Resistance, 3 PLOS MED. 436, 436 (2006),
available
at
http://www.plosmedicine.org/article/
info%3Adoi%2F10.1371%2Fjournal.pmed.0030178; Natasha Singer, Sex and the Single
Drug, N.Y. TIMES, June 27, 2010, at BU3; Duff Wilson, Push to Market Pill Stirs Debate on
Sexual Desire, N.Y. TIMES, June 17, 2010, at A1; Annemarie Jutel, Why the Cure for Flagging Female Libido is Hard to Swallow, BRISBANE TIMES (Dec. 8, 2009),
http://www.brisbanetimes.com.au/lifestyle/diet-and-fitness/why-the-cure-for-flaggingfemale-libido-is-hard-to-swallow-20091207-ketm.html; Ray Moynihan, Sex Drugs for
Women Don’t Seem to Be Working, ABC NEWS ONLINE (Sept. 1, 2010),
http://www.abc.net.au/unleashed/stories/s2998870.htm; Susan Seligson, Female Libido Pill
Leaves
Ethicist
Cold,
BU
TODAY
ONLINE
(June
25,
2010),
http://www.bu.edu/today/node/11179.
27
Jutel, supra note 26.
28
Ronald W. Pies, FDA Lacks Desire for Flibanserin—But Does Hypoactive Sexual
Desire
Disorder
Even
Exist?,
PSYCHIATRIC
TIMES
(Aug.
4,
2010),
http://www.psychiatrictimes.com/sexual-disorders/content/article/10168/1632801.
For a
discussion of how the term “disease” is defined, see infra Part III.B.
29
Ray Moynihan & David Henry, The Fight Against Disease Mongering: Generating
Knowledge for Action, 3 PLOS MED. 425, 425 (2006), available at
http://www.plosmedicine.org/article/info%3Adoi%2F10.1371%2Fjournal.pmed.0030191.
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into medical diagnoses suitable for pharmacological treatment.” Critics
argue that these promotional practices “turn[] healthy people into patients,
31
waste[] precious resources, and cause[] iatrogenic harm.”
Despite the growing attention to disease-branding and drugmongering in the public health, sociology-of-health, economic, and advertising fields, there appears to be a critical abstinence in the legal realm.
There is a dearth of legal literature addressing these practices as a unique
phenomenon or evaluating the regulatory issues and liability implications
32
for the pharmaceutical industry that stem from them. This Comment concedes that opposition to the phenomena of disease-branding and drugmongering, which critics of the pharmaceutical industry and of the FDA
have expounded, is valid from a sociology-of-health perspective. But such
criticism is inappropriate from a regulatory point of view. This Comment
argues that the practices of disease-branding and drug-mongering comply
33
with the Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act (“FD&C Act”) and its accompa34
nying regulations addressing prescription drug advertising. Because this
Comment concludes that critics are unlikely to succeed in challenging these
practices from an administrative-law perspective, it will consider the viability of a legal cause of action against such practices, using the common law
torts of intentional infliction of emotional distress (IIED), negligent infliction of emotional distress (NIED), and medical malpractice. Upon analyzing these litigation strategies, the Comment concludes that a claim for
IIED, NIED, or medical malpractice could possibly survive a motion to
dismiss and could be decided on its merits. Nevertheless, such a claim
would be unlikely to succeed and, if it did, would ultimately be ineffective
as a comprehensive reform measure. Accordingly, the most successful and
effective route to change these practices on a systemic level is in the legislative arena. Therefore, this Comment considers a previously introduced
congressional bill, the Independent Drug Education and Outreach Act
(IDEA), and proposes and evaluates possible amendments to this bill that
would address the negative effects of disease-branding and drug-mongering
30

Tiefer, supra note 26, at 436.
Moynihan & Henry, supra note 29, at 425. An iatrogenic injury is one “induced inadvertently by a physician or surgeon or by medical treatment or diagnostic procedures.”
Iatrogenic Definition, MERRIAM-WEBSTER’S MED. DICTIONARY, http://www.merriamwebster.com/medical/iatrogenic (last visited Mar. 2, 2012).
32
See Lars Noah, Pigeonholing Illness: Medical Diagnosis as a Legal Construct, 50
HASTINGS L.J. 241, 242 (1999) (“Little or no attention is paid to the ways in which medical
professionals react to the external pressures emanating from, or mediated by, legal institutions with regard to defining and diagnosing disease conditions.”). A LexisNexis search of
the “U.S. Law Reviews and Journals, Combined” database reveals zero hits for “drug mongering,” zero hits for “disease branding,” and sixteen hits for “disease mongering” (the majority of which are simply quoting works by Ray Moynihan).
33
21 U.S.C. §§ 301–399d (2006).
34
See generally 21 C.F.R. § 202.1 (2011) (prescription drug advertisements).
31
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practices. Through medical education strategies, such as “academic detailing” of physicians, critics can combat what they perceive as pervasive and
insidious pharmaceutical promotional practices.
Part II of this Comment examines the historical and legal development
of the FDA’s regulatory framework as well as the evolution of the federal
drug approval process and DTC advertising of approved prescription drugs.
Part III discusses the sociology-of-health analytical framework and considers how the social construction and medicalization of disease enables disease-branding and drug-mongering. Part IV examines potential causes of
action that critics can use to challenge the pharmaceutical industry in the
tort arena through claims for IIED, NIED, and medical malpractice. It then
considers legislative and educational reform efforts as a prospective remedy to combat the negative effects of disease-branding and drug-mongering.
Part V concludes.
II. THE HISTORY OF DRUG REGULATION AND THE CURRENT LEGAL
FRAMEWORK
A. Historical Development of the Statutory Definition of a “Drug”
The development of a regulatory framework for approving drugs be35
gan in 1906, but the relevant statutory definition of “drug” was first
36
amended in 1938. The legislative history of the FD&C Act reveals the
37
evolution of the definition. During the congressional hearings leading up
to the 1938 Act, there was growing concern about the lack of jurisdictional
reach. The “definition for the term ‘drug’ fail[ed] to cover drugs invented
38
to alter the structure or function of the body,” as opposed to those “substances intended to be used for the cure, mitigation, or prevention of dis39
ease,” to which the 1906 Act definition was limited. The principal way in
which the 1938 amendments altered the definition of “drug” was that
“[d]rugs intended for diagnosing illness or for remedying underweight or
overweight or for otherwise affecting bodily structure or function [were]
40
41
subjected to regulation.”
The 1938 amendments added § 321(g)(3),
35
See Pure Food and Drug Act of 1906, Pub. L. No 59-384, 34 Stat. 768 (1906) (repealed 1938).
36
Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act of 1938, Pub. L. No. 75-717, § 201(g), 52
Stat. 1040, 1041 (1938) (current version at 21 U.S.C. § 321(g)(1) (2006)).
37
See generally LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE FEDERAL FOOD, DRUG & COSMETIC ACT
AND ITS AMENDMENTS (1979) [hereinafter LEGISLATIVE HISTORY FD&C ACT].
38
81 CONG. REC. 1947 (1937) (statement of Rep. Edward H. Rees), reprinted in 5
LEGISLATIVE HISTORY FD&C ACT, supra note 37, at 816, 816.
39
§ 7, 34 Stat. at 769.
40
S. REP. NO. 75-2139, at 2 (1938), reprinted in 6 LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF FD&C ACT,
supra note 37, at 300, 301.
41
§ 201(g), 52 Stat. at 1041 (current version at 21 U.S.C. § 321(g)(1)(C) (2006)).
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which defined the structure/function drugs to include all products “which
are sold to correct the function and structure of the body, such as obesity
42
preparations which were not covered by the act.” The purpose of this
broadened and inclusive definition was “to reach the use of fat reducers,
43
particularly since obesity may not be a disease.”
One should consider the FDA’s regulatory capacity over obesity drugs
in order to analyze how “structure/function” drugs became subject to FDA
regulation. Prior to 1938, obesity drugs were outside the FDA’s jurisdictional scope, but now, especially within the past couple of years, the FDA
has taken several decisive regulatory actions with respect to obesity drugs.
On October 8, 2010, Abbott Labs withdrew the diet drug Meridia from the
44
market. A week later, the FDA “declined to approve what would have
45
been the first new prescription diet pill in more than a decade.” Shortly
46
thereafter, the FDA rejected another diet pill, called Qnexa. Dr. Ken Fujioka, Director of the Center for Weight Management at the Scripps Clinic
in San Diego, commented how “[i]t looks pretty bleak out there for anyone
47
trying to get a drug approval for weight loss.”

42
Food, Drugs, and Cosmetics: Hearings on S. 5 Before a Subcomm. of the S. Comm.
on Commerce, 74th Cong. 29 (1935) (statement of Charles Wesley Dunn), reprinted in 3
LEGISLATIVE HISTORY FD&C ACT, supra note 37, at 192, 224. At this hearing, Mr. Dunn
was representing the Associated Grocery Manufacturers of America, Inc., the American
Pharmaceutical Manufacturers Association, the National Association of Dog Food Manufacturers, and himself.
43
Food, Drugs, and Cosmetics: Hearings on H.R. 6906, H.R. 8805, H.R. 8941 and S. 5
Before a Subcomm. of the H. Comm. on Interstate and Foreign Commerce, 74th Cong. 55
(1935) (statement of Walter G. Campbell, Chief, Food and Drug Administration) [hereinafter Food, Drug, and Cosmetics], reprinted in 4 LEGISLATIVE HISTORY FD&C ACT, supra
note 37, at 312, 370; cf. Annemarie Jutel, Sociology of Diagnosis, A Preliminary Review, 31
SOC. HEALTH & ILLNESS 278, 292 (2009) (“Commercial interests have an important stake in
highlighting overweight as a medical diagnosis, rather than a statistical deviation from normative weight.”).
44
Andrew Pollack, Abbott Labs Withdraws Meridia From the Market, N.Y. TIMES, Oct.
9, 2010, at B3.
45
Andrew Pollack, No F.D.A. Approval for New Diet Pill, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 24, 2010, at
A27; see also Andrew Pollack, F.D.A Panel Urges Denial of Diet Drug, N.Y. TIMES, Sept.
17, 2010, at B1. An FDA advisory panel
recommended against approval of a new diet pill, the latest setback in efforts
to develop treatments for the nation’s obesity epidemic . . . . The negative
vote is the second setback this year in attempts to win approval for what
would be the first new prescription weight-loss drug in more than a decade.
Id.
46
Andrew Pollack, F.D.A. Rejects Qnexa, a Third Weight-Loss Drug, N.Y. TIMES, Oct.
29, 2010, at A1.
47
Id. But see Andrew Pollack, Advisory Panel Favors Approval for Weight-Loss Drug,
N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 23, 2012, at B1 (noting that the advisory committee recommended approval of Qnexa and that the FDA is expected to decide whether to approve the drug by
April 17, 2012).
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This observation would have seemed absurd to any drug manufacturer
prior to the 1938 Act, which expanded the definition of drug to include
structure/function drugs specifically in order to place obesity drugs within
48
its regulatory jurisdiction. Prior to 1938, obesity was not considered a
disease and obesity drugs could only be regulated through FDA’s enforce49
ment authority over adulteration and misbranding; now, because approval
is required, the FDA has taken regulatory action on three obesity drugs in a
single month, and obesity is considered not only a disease, but an epidem50
ic.
A drug is now defined as any article intended to diagnose, cure, mitigate, treat, or prevent disease (“disease drug”) or any article intended to af51
fect the structure or function of the body (“structure/function drug”). The
addition of structure/function drugs into the regulatory scheme is relevant
for the discussion of disease-branding because it rebuts the critics’ argument that the FDA approves drugs to treat non-diseases or industry52
invented ailments.
B. Regulatory Classification and Approval of a Drug
Drugs are classified as either “new drugs” or drugs that are “generally
53
recognized as safe and effective” (GRASE). Before a new drug can be
marketed, the FDA requires approval of an NDA under 21 U.S.C. §
355(b)(1), of an Abbreviated New Drug Application under 21 U.S.C. §
54
355(j), or through the hybrid 21 U.S.C. § 355(b)(2) process. GRASE
drugs can be marketed without these approvals if they comply with an

48

See supra notes 40–43 and accompanying text.
For a discussion of how the FD&C Act’s definition of drug was amended because
obesity was not considered a disease, and thus articles intended to remedy obesity escaped
classification and regulation, see Nutrilab, Inc. v. Schweiker, 713 F.2d 335 (7th Cir. 1983).
For a suggestion that obesity is not a disease, see Food, Drug, and Cosmetics, supra note
43, at 370.
50
Benjamin Caballero, The Global Epidemic of Obesity: An Overview, 29
EPIDEMIOLOGIC
REV.
1,
1
(2007),
available
at
http://epirev.oxfordjournals.org/content/29/1/1.full.pdf.
51
21 U.S.C. § 321(g)(1)(B)–(C) (2006) (“[A drug includes] articles intended for use in
the diagnosis, cure, mitigation, treatment, or prevention of disease in man or other animals;
and articles (other than food) intended to affect the structure or any function of the body of
man or other animals . . . .” (emphasis added)).
52
See infra Part II.B (discussing that the safety-and-efficacy standard of approval is the
same for all new drugs).
53
§ 321(p)(1)(“[New drug is a]ny drug . . . the composition of which is such that such
drug is not generally recognized, among experts qualified . . . to evaluate the safety and effectiveness of drugs, as safe and effective for use under the condition prescribed, recommended, or suggested in the labeling thereof . . . .” (emphasis added)).
54
Id. § 355(a).
49
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55

over-the-counter (OTC) drug monograph.
Whether drugs are “disease
drugs” or “structure/function drugs” is largely irrelevant for regulatory pur56
poses because both must be safe and effective for their intended use. But
whether the drug’s intended use involves the treatment of certain diseases
is relevant because “the status of a health condition as a disease potentially
57
affects a number of [the FDA’s] regulatory decisions.” For example, the
FDA gives accelerated approval for certain fast-track products that are “in58
tended for the treatment of a serious or life-threatening condition,” priori59
ty review status for new drugs that treat tropical diseases, and orphan
60
drug status, which includes licensing incentives, to products intended for
61
the treatment of rare diseases. Outside of these specific provisions, however, classifying drugs into disease drugs or structure/function drugs is
largely irrelevant because the regulatory approval process is the same. Although the concept of “disease” has important applications in federal drug
62
regulation, it is only relevant to the initial approval. The FDA’s regulation of the subsequent advertising and promotional practices does not consider, nor do the agency’s regulators monitor, the status of the disease, as
long as the advertisement is not misleading and the drug remains safe and
63
effective for its intended use, whatever that use may be.
The FDA’s decision to approve a new drug “entail[s] a risk-benefit
calculation, so the perceived importance of the therapeutic benefit naturally
64
will influence the Agency’s licensing judgments.” Although this observation may be important for the initial approval process, once the drug is ap-

55

21 C.F.R. § 330.1 (2011) (“[An OTC drug] is generally recognized as safe and effective and is not misbranded if it meets . . . each of the conditions contained in any applicable
monograph.”). Although there are three routes to market for new drugs, this Comment will
focus on brand name drugs that require an NDA.
56
Compare § 355(a) (safety and efficacy requirement for new drugs), with § 330.10
(safety-and-efficacy requirement for OTC drugs).
57
Noah, supra note 32, at 259.
58
21 U.S.C. § 356(a)(1) (2006).
59
Id. § 360n. See generally Health Topics—Tropical Diseases, WORLD HEALTH ORG.,
http://www.who.int/topics/tropical_diseases/en/ (last visited Feb. 4, 2012) (“Tropical diseases encompass all diseases that occur solely, or principally, in the tropics. In practice, the
term is often taken to refer to infectious diseases that thrive in hot, humid conditions . . . .”).
60
Id. § 360cc(a)(2) (seven-year exclusive licensing period).
61
Id. § 360bb(a)(2).
62
Noah, supra note 32, at 242 (“[The concept of disease] helps to inform . . . riskbenefit calculations performed by regulatory agencies charged with licensing therapeutic
products . . . .”).
63
See generally 21 C.F.R. § 202.1(e)(1) (2011) (noting that the focus of regulating direct-to-consumer prescription drug advertisements is not on the disease but on ensuring that
the advertisements “include information relating to the major side effects and contraindications of the advertised drugs”).
64
Noah, supra note 32, at 261.
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proved and marketed, categorizing products as disease or structure/function
drugs sets up a false dichotomy because every drug must comply with the
same laws and regulations. Approval is based on safety and efficacy, and
although the risk-calculus might be different for drugs that treat lifethreatening diseases as compared to those drugs that treat less dire lifestyle
problems, the regulatory approval standard is the same.
An application for FDA approval to market a new drug requires, in
part, a summary with a “statement identifying the pharmacologic class of
the drug and a discussion of the scientific rationale for the drug, its intend65
ed use, and the potential clinical benefits of the drug product.” Once the
application is received, the “FDA will approve an application after it determines that the drug meets the statutory standards for safety and effec66
tiveness, manufacturing and controls, [and] labeling.” Through the approval of an NDA, the most rigorous procedural mechanism of
pharmaceutical regulation, the FDA acts as a gatekeeper by determining
67
which drugs enter and exit the marketplace. The FDA uses this gatekeeping authority to approve a drug company’s NDA and regulate the flow
68
of drugs to the market.
For example, consider Nuedexta, a drug that was recently approved to
69
treat pseudobulbar affect (PBA), a condition “characterized by involuntary, sudden, and frequent episodes of laughing and/or crying . . . [which]
typically occur out of proportion or incongruent to the underlying emotion70
al state.” Critics of disease-branding may question whether episodes of
laughing and crying constitute a disease—that is, whether PBA is an industry-invented disease that the drug sponsor created in order to provide the
FDA with a jurisdictional hook under § 321(g)(1)(B) and thus approve
Nuedexta as a “disease” drug. PBA, however, is classified in the International Classification of Diseases as “[o]ther specified nonpsychotic mental

65

21 C.F.R. § 314.50(c)(2)(ii) (2011); see also 21 U.S.C. § 355(d) (2006).
Id. § 314.105(c); see also § 355(d).
67
See Daniel Carpenter, Reputation, Gatekeeping, and the Politics of Post-Marketing
Drug Regulation, 8 VIRTUAL MENTOR: AM. MED. ASS’N J. ETHICS 403, 404 (2006), available at http://virtualmentor.ama-assn.org/2006/06/pdf/pfor1-0606.pdf.
68
See Daniel Carpenter, The Political Economy of FDA Drug Review: Processing, Politics, and Lessons for Policy, 23 HEALTH AFF. 52, 52 (2004), available at
http://content.healthaffairs.org/content/23/1/52.full.pdf+html.
69
Letter from Russell Katz, Dir., Div. of Neurology Prods., Office of Drug Evaluation
I, Ctr. for Drug Evaluation & Research, to Randall Kaye, Vice President, Clinical & Med.
Affairs,
Avanir
Pharm.
(Oct.
29,
2010),
available
at
http://www.accessdata.fda.gov/drugsatfda_docs/appletter/2010/021879s000ltr.pdf .
70
NUEDEXTA, FULL PRESCRIBING INFORMATION 3 (2010) [hereinafter, NUEDEXTA],
available at http://www.nuedexta.com/NUEDEXTA_Full_Prescribing_Information-1.pdf.
66
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71

disorders following organic brain damage.” In other words, PBA accompanies serious disease states, such as amyotrophic lateral sclerosis or multi72
ple sclerosis, and Nuedexta treats specific functions of the body, the ab73
normality of which constitutes symptoms of these diseases. Thus, altalthough distinctions between disease drugs and structure/function drugs
may be nebulous and overlapping, the status of the drug as one intending to
treat diseases or affect bodily structures/functions is legally irrelevant because both classifications of drugs require proof of safety and efficacy prior
74
to approval.
C. DTC Advertising
75

Once a drug and its labeling are approved, the drug sponsor can
promote the drug and legally use DTC advertising as part of a comprehen76
sive marketing and promotional strategy. The distinct—yet occasionally
overlapping—regulatory roles of the FDA and the Federal Trade Commission (FTC) in the marketing and advertising of approved drugs are important to consider. Based on the FTC-FDA Memorandum of Understand77
ing, the FDA has jurisdiction over DTC advertising of prescription
78
drugs.
The FDA’s rules and regulations control the industry, and the
FDA’s Office of Prescription Drug Promotion (OPDP), formerly the Divi-

71

Diseases Tabular List and Index, INT’L CLASSIFICATION OF DISEASES-9-CM,
http://www.icd9cm.net/ (search “Search Diseases” for “Pseudobulbar affect”; then follow
“Pseudobulbar affect (PBA) 310.8” hyperlink) (last updated Apr. 9, 2011).
72
See NUEDEXTA, supra note 70, at 3.
73
Id.
74
The same analysis applies to obesity drugs, which affect the structure/function of the
body, but also treat a disease (assuming that obesity is properly classified as a disease).
75
See 21 U.S.C. § 321(m) (2006) (definition of labeling); id. § 355(b)(1)(F) (labeling
included in NDA).
76
See generally 21 C.F.R. § 202.1(e) (2011) (describing prescription drug advertisements broadcasted through television).
77
FDA-FTC Memorandum of Understanding, 36 Fed. Reg. 18539 (Sept. 16, 1971).
See generally Thomas B. Leary, The Ongoing Dialogue Between the Food and Drug Administration and the Federal Trade Commission, 59 FOOD & DRUG L.J. 209 (2004) (describing the different roles of the FDA and FTC in regulating drug labeling and advertisements,
specifically in reference to DTC advertising of prescription drugs).
78
FDA-FTC Memorandum of Understanding, 36 Fed, Reg. at 18539 (“The Food and
Drug Administration has primary responsibility with respect to the regulation of the truth or
falsity of prescription drug advertising.” (emphasis added)). A drug is classified as a prescription (Rx) drug if “because of its toxicity or other potentiality for harmful effect, or the
method of its use, or the collateral measures necessary to its use, is not safe for use except
under the supervision of a practitioner licensed by law to administer such drug.” 21 U.S.C.
§ 353(b)(1)(A) (2006).
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sion of Drug Marketing, Advertising and Communications, enforces the
79
laws.
A prescription drug DTC advertisement must present a fair balance
80
between risks and benefits and will be deemed misbranded unless it con81
tains a “major statement” describing side effects and contraindications.
In addition, sponsors of DTC broadcast advertisements are required to present a brief summary of the necessary side effects and contraindications or,
alternatively, may make an “adequate provision . . . for dissemination of
82
the approved . . . labeling in connection with the broadcast presentation.”
In order to understand how these regulations govern disease-branding
and drug-mongering one must examine the FDA’s current interpretation of
rules governing DTC broadcast advertising. In August 1999, the FDA issued a final guidance entitled Guidance for Industry: Consumer-Directed
Broadcast Advertisements (“Guidance”), which broadened the scope of
83
permissible DTC advertising of pharmaceutical products to consumers.
In the Guidance, the FDA expanded the scope of acceptable advertising
practices by allowing for an alternative method of complying with the brief
79

The Office of Prescription Drug Promotion (OPDP), U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN.,
http://www.fda.gov/AboutFDA/CentersOffices/OfficeofMedicalProductsandTobacco/CDE
R/ucm090142.htm (last updated Jan. 5, 2012).
80
Drug Advertising: A Glossary of Terms, U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN.,
http://www.fda.gov/Drugs/ResourcesForYou/Consumers/PrescriptionDrugAdvertising/ucm
072025.htm# (last visited Jan. 20, 2012) [hereinafter Drug Advertising: A Glossary of
Terms] (“[Product-claim ads must] give a ‘fair balance’ of information about drug risks as
compared with information about drug benefits. This means that the content and presentation of a drug’s most important risks must be reasonably similar to the content and presentation of its benefits.”).
81
See 21 U.S.C. § 352(n) (2006).
In the case of an advertisement for a drug subject to section 503(b)(1) [prescription drug status] presented directly to consumers in television or radio
format and stating the name of the drug and its conditions of use, the major
statement relating to side effects and contraindications shall be presented in a
clear, conspicuous, and neutral matter.
Id.; see also Drug Advertising: A Glossary of Terms, supra note 80 (defining “major statement”).
82
21 C.F.R. § 202.1(e)(1) (2011).
Advertisements broadcast through media such as radio, television, or telephone communications systems shall include information relating to the major side effects and contraindications of the advertised drugs in the audio or
audio and visual parts of the presentation and unless adequate provision is
made for dissemination of the approved or permitted package labeling in
connection with the broadcast presentation shall contain a brief summary of
all necessary information related to side effects and contraindications.
Id.
83
See U.S. FOOD AND DRUG ADMIN., GUIDANCE FOR INDUSTRY—CONSUMER-DIRECTED
BROADCAST
ADVERTISEMENTS
(1999),
available
at
http://www.fda.gov/downloads/Drugs/GuidanceComplianceRegulatoryInformation/Guidanc
es/ucm070065.pdf.
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summary requirement in 21 C.F.R. § 201(e)(1). The FDA concluded that
the major statement of side effects, coupled with the adequate provision for
disseminating approved labeling, “can provide the information disclosure
85
required for [DTC] broadcast advertisements.”
The Guidance explains different approaches that satisfy the adequate86
provision requirement.
These approaches include telling patients that
physicians can provide more information, disclosing a website that provides access to the package labeling, and explaining the location of a con87
current print advertisement appearing in a publication. Applying OPDP
rules and regulations to DTC advertising suggests that the drugs are not
misbranded in violation of the FD&C Act because the advertisements contain a major statement with adequate provisions; therefore, the diseasebranding and drug-mongering promotional strategies are fully compliant
with the FD&C Act.
For example, a Zelnorm DTC advertisement contains the following
major statement: “You should not take Zelnorm if you have a history of diarrhea, kidney, liver, or gall bladder disease, intestinal blockage or adhesions. Tell your doctor if you get diarrhea or cramping, worsening of ab88
dominal pain, dizziness, or headache.”
The adequate provision is the
89
statement on the bottom of the screen: “See our ad in SHAPE magazine.”
A Toviaz DTC advertisement contains the following major statement: “If
you have certain stomach problems or glaucoma or cannot empty your
bladder you should not take Toviaz. Toviaz can cause blurred vision and
drowsiness so use caution when driving or doing unsafe tasks. The most
90
common side effects are dry mouth and constipation.” The adequate pro91
vision states: “See our ad in Cooking Light.” In addition, a Latisse advertisement includes the following:
If you are using prescription products for lowering eye pressure . . . only use Latisse under close doctor care. May cause eyelid skin darkening which may be reversible and there is potential for increased brown

84
Bernard J. Garbutt III & Melinda E. Hofmann, Recent Developments in Pharmaceutical Products Liability Law: Failure to Warn, the Learned Intermediary Defense, and Other
Issues in the New Millennium, 58 FOOD & DRUG L.J. 269, 274 (2003).
85
U.S. FOOD AND DRUG ADMIN., supra note 83, at 3.
86
Id. at 2–3.
87
Id.
88
Zelnorm TV Ad (2003), YOUTUBE (Aug. 8, 2010), http://www.youtube.com/
watch?v=81IVMc5EfN0&feature=related [hereinafter Zelnorm TV Ad (2003)].
89
Id.
90
CR AdWatch: Toviaz, CONSUMER REP., http://bcove.me/3232jaew (last visited Feb. 4,
2012) [hereinafter CR AdWatch: Toviaz].
91
Id.
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iris pigmentation which is likely permanent . . . . Common side effects
92
include itchy eyes and eye redness.

The adequate provision includes a website, a telephone number, and the
following statement at the bottom of the screen: “See our ad in Allure mag93
azine.”
This is not to say that all DTC broadcast advertising is legal per se.
There are countless examples (beginning with the first ever DTC advertisement) of the FDA taking regulatory actions against pharmaceutical
94
companies because of false and misleading promotional materials. In addition, the FDA has required corrective action for DTC broadcast advertisements that violate the balance requirement, for example, when an advertisement overstates benefits, expands intended uses, or minimizes side
95
effects. Nevertheless, individual instances of misleading advertisements
represent mere isolated tactical mistakes by drug companies because disease-branding and drug-mongering, as a holistic, comprehensive promotional strategy, are legal from a regulatory perspective.
Furthermore, the focus on the major statement to achieve compliance
96
only applies to product-claim ads. Reminder ads, which call attention to a

92

Latisse
Brooke
Shields
Commercial,
YOUTUBE (July
15,
2009),
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=VqRyv8abWR4 [hereinafter Latisse Brooke Shields
Commercial].
93
Id.
94
See, e.g., Letter from Tracy L. Acker, Regulatory Review Officer, Div. of Drug
Mktg., Adver., and Commc’n, Food and Drug Admin., to Sam Boddapati, Dir., Regulatory
Affairs, SuperGen, Inc. (Jan. 6, 1997), available at
http://www.fda.gov/downloads/Drugs/GuidanceComplianceRegulatoryInformation/Enforce
mentActivitiesbyFDA/WarningLettersandNoticeofViolationLetterstoPharmaceuticalCompanies/UCM1691
85.pdf.
95
See, e.g., Yaz FDA Required “Clear Up,” YOUTUBE (Feb. 26, 2009),
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=EO-G8O0lHq0 (Bayer’s corrective advertisement for
Yaz made pursuant to the Warning Letter from Thomas Abrams, Dir., Div. of Drug Mktg.,
Adver., & Commc’n, to Reinhard Franzen, President & Chief Exec. Officer, Bayer
HealthCare
Pharm.,
Inc.
1
(Oct.
3,
2008),
available
at
http://www.fda.gov/downloads/Drugs/GuidanceComplianceRegulatoryInformation/Enforce
mentActivitiesbyFDA/WarningLettersandNoticeofViolationLetterstoPharmaceuticalCompanies/ucm05399
3.pdf (“The TV Ads are misleading because they broaden the drug’s indication, overstate
the efficacy of YAZ, and minimize serious risks associated with the use of the drug.”)).
96
See 21 C.F.R. § 202.1(e)(1)(2011); Basics of Drug Ads, U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN.,
http://www.fda.gov/Drugs/ResourcesForYou/Consumers/PrescriptionDrugAdvertising/ucm
072077.htm (last updated June 24, 2009) [hereinafter Basics of Drug Ads]. See generally
Prescription
Drug
Advertising,
U.S.
FOOD
&
DRUG
ADMIN.,
http://www.fda.gov/Drugs/ResourcesForYou/Consumers/PrescriptionDrugAdvertising/defa
ult.htm (last updated May 26, 2011) (presenting examples of the different types of prescription drug advertisements).
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brand name drug but do not include indicated uses, and help-seeking ads
or disease-awareness ads, which describe a disease but do not recommend a
98
specific drug, are exempt from the provisions that require a major state99
ment about side effects. These types of ads are relevant for this Comment’s later discussion about how DTC advertising enables disease100
branding.
III. THE MEDICALIZATION AND SOCIAL CONSTRUCTION OF DISEASE
The phenomena of disease medicalization and the social construction of disease provide the background and theoretical framework for ana101
lyzing disease-branding and drug-mongering strategies.
This framework
provides a better understanding of the disease-branding and drugmongering strategies that the pharmaceutical industry employs because
once a company defines the disease—and treatment of the disease in terms
of the drug’s intended use—the drug can be legally marketed in the form of
102
DTC advertising.
Accordingly, a crucial initial inquiry is what is the
definition of disease for the purpose of DTC advertising?
A. Defining Disease
One medical dictionary defines “disease” as “any deviation from or
interruption of the normal structure or function of any part, organ, or system (or combination thereof) of the body that is manifested by a characteristic set of symptoms and signs and whose etiology, pathology, and prog103
nosis may be known or unknown.”
A legal dictionary defines “disease”
104
as “a deviation from the healthy and normal functioning of the body.”
But, “it may be absurd to decide on a concept of disease . . . [because]
[t]here will always be ‘normal’ people who will want treatment and ‘sick’
105
people who will refuse it.”
Ultimately, the concept of disease appears to
106
be malleable and the definition can change through social forces and

97

§ 202.1(e)(2)(i).
Basics of Drug Ads, supra note 96.
99
See id.; § 202.1(e)(2)(i).
100
See infra Part IV.B.1.c (illustrating the strategies used by various DTC drug advertisements).
101
See infra Part III.B.
102
See supra notes 75–76 and accompanying text.
103
Noah, supra note 32, at 244 (quoting DORLAND’S ILLUSTRATED MEDICAL DICTIONARY
481 (27th ed. 1988)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
104
BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 535 (9th ed. 2009).
105
P.R. Shankar & P. Subish, Disease Mongering, 48 SING. MED. J. 275, 277 (2007).
106
Noah, supra note 32, at 243 (“[S]cholars and physicians alike have recognized that
diseases are socially constructed and mutable.”).
98
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107

marketing campaigns.
That the definition is imprecise has been confirmed through empirical study:
In 1979, a study conducted by a group of Canadian researchers sought a
unifying definition of “disease” by asking doctors to classify 34 different conditions as diseases or non-diseases. . . . The study concluded
with the observation . . . [that] “there is no general agreement on the
108
definition of ‘a disease.’”

This Comment uses “disease” to refer to the term that the FDA interprets in the FD&C Act, but explains that its medico-legal definition is ambiguous and thus susceptible to exploitation by pharmaceutical marketing.
Using the sociology-of-health framework, this Comment exposes, explains,
and clarifies the medico-legal implications of defining drugs and disease,
without reshaping the contours of the FD&C Act definition. That the disease concept is malleable is significant, not necessarily from a regulatoryapproval perspective, but for the purposes of DTC advertising. Because
there is no precise definition, drug companies have capitalized on this am109
biguity to create diseases for marketing and promotional purposes.
Revealing this malleability clarifies the FDA’s purpose in this area—
regulating the safety and efficacy of drugs, not the authenticity of diseases—and provides a framework for analyzing DTC promotional practices
based on intended use.
B. The Medicalization of Disease
Medicalization is the process “through which aspects of life previously outside the jurisdiction of medicine come to be construed as medical
110
problems.”
The sociology-of-health framework of medicalization explains that medicine is “understood as a social and cultural enterprise as
well as a medico-scientific one,” such that disease is defined through socio111
cultural forces, rather than clear scientific consensus.
Essentially, dis107

See, e,g., infra note 139 and accompanying text (discussing how FSD became
HSDD).
108
Eric J. Gouvin, Drunk Driving and the Alcoholic Offender: A New Approach to an
Old Problem, 12 AM. J.L. & MED. 99, 104–05 (1986) (quoting E.J.M. Cambell et al., The
Concept of Disease, 2 BRIT. MED. J. 757, 757 (1979)).
109
See, e.g., Marc Kaufman, Hormone Replacement Gets New Scrutiny: Finding of Increased Risks Prompts Federal Effort, WASH. POST, Aug. 14, 2002, at A1 (“[F]ederal officials want to explore whether hormone therapies and their producers have encouraged women to believe menopause is a condition to be treated, rather than an inevitable and natural set
of changes to be managed.”).
110
Adele E. Clarke et al., Biomedicalization: Technoscientific Transformations of
Health, Illness, and U.S. Biomedicine, in THE SOCIOLOGY OF HEALTH & ILLNESS: CRITICAL
PERSPECTIVES 442, 442 (Peter Conrad ed., 2005); see also Shankar & Subish, supra note
105, at 275 (“Medicalisation is the process of turning ordinary life events and its customary
ups and downs into medical conditions.”).
111
Clarke, supra note 110, at 443.
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ease is a social construction: “In examining the social meaning of illness,
we focus on the role of social and cultural values that shape the perception
112
of a disease or malady.”
The medicalization of disease is the underlying
theoretical framework through which one can analyze how diseasebranding and drug-mongering occur in practice. Accordingly, the medicalization concept elucidates why and how the definition of disease is malleable and how it is both outside the scope of the FDA’s jurisdiction and ripe
for pharmaceutical promotional exploitation.
The study of medicalization does not belong solely to the sociologyof-health realm because nosology—the branch of medicine concerned with
the classification and description of known diseases—has a particular and
significant application in the law. One commentator, Professor of Law
Lars Noah, has noted that “no one has systematically assessed the role that
the law plays in the diagnostic enterprise . . . [but that] the law and lawyers
113
have played a subtle, but often significant, role in ‘framing’ disease.”
The way that diseases are framed or defined in the socio-cultural milieu
and later accepted in the mainstream impacts the regulatory status of drugs
used to treat these diseases as well as how pharmaceutical companies create
114
advertising campaigns.
Sociologists have explained that “recognizing that drugs are concrete
material objects does not prevent their simultaneous analysis as complex
115
social phenomena.”
The “illness identity” concept helps explain how
this social phenomenon emerges: “[A]n illness identity refers to an understanding of self, and affiliation with others, on the basis of shared experi116
ences of symptoms and suffering.”
The illness identity subsequently be117
comes associated with particular pharmaceutical treatments.
For
example, consider how menopause, which used to be described as “a natu-

112

Peter Conrad, The Social and Cultural Meanings of Illness, in THE SOCIOLOGY OF
HEALTH & ILLNESS: CRITICAL PERSPECTIVES, supra note 110, at 104, 104.
113
Noah, supra note 32, at 252 (internal quotation marks and citations omitted).
114
See, e.g., Ed Silverman, Disease Mongering? The Selling of Fibromyalgia,
PHARMALOT BLOG (Jan. 14, 2008, 7:50 AM), http://www.pharmalot.com/2008/01/diseasemongering-the-selling-of-fibromyalgia/ (describing the case of fibromyalgia).
115
David Cohen et al., Medications and the Pharmaceutical Industry, in THE SOCIOLOGY
OF HEALTH & ILLNESS: CRITICAL PERSPECTIVES, supra note 110, at 275, 278.
116
Kristin Barker, Self-Help Literature and the Making of an Illness Identity: The Case
of Fibromyalgia Syndrome (FMS), in THE SOCIOLOGY OF HEALTH & ILLNESS: CRITICAL
PERSPECTIVES, supra note 110, at 133, 135.
117
See, e.g., “Facing Fibromyalgia, Finding Hope” PSA by the NFA, YOUTUBE (Sept.
12, 2007), http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=SMCECMsW1RE&feature=related [hereinafter Facing Fibromyalgia, Finding Hope] (the public service announcement by the National
Fibromyalgia Association, co-sponsored by Pfizer, the maker of Lyrica, the first FDAapproved treatment for fibromyalgia).
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ral life event for women, became defined as a ‘deficiency disease’ in the
118
1960s when medical therapy became readily available to treat it.”
The concept of disease, and its impact on promoted drug treatments, is
malleable especially as medicines become “increasingly available for conditions which have so far been regarded as the natural result of ageing or as
119
a part of the normal range of human emotions.”
Thus, “although biological and clinical factors have set boundaries for which symptoms might
plausibly be linked in a disease concept, social influences have largely de120
termined which symptom clusters have become diseases.”
The pharmaceutical industry and marketing firms have played an important role in perpetuating this process: “Sadness, or sexual problems, both arguably nonmedical in nature, but variably transformed by the diagnostic labels ‘depression’ and ‘erectile dysfunction’, both of which trigger an army of med121
icalised actions, therapies and processes.”
Fibromyalgia, or fibromyalgia syndrome (FMS)—”a chronic disorder
characterized by widespread pain, tenderness, and stiffness of muscles . . .
that is typically accompanied by fatigue, headache, and sleep disturb122
123
ances” —is a classic example of the social construction of disease.
While medical accounts of patients suffering from symptoms associated
with this illness have existed for hundreds of years, the actual disease “has
124
existed as a specific diagnosis only since the mid-1970s.” FMS is a controversial pain disorder because “there is no commonly accepted medical or
125
organic explanation.” FMS is a “contested illness” because many people
suffer from it, but physicians “tend to be skeptical about its organic
126
origin.”
Some doctors who do not consider FMS a medically diagnosable disease suggest that “diagnosing the condition actually worsens suffering by causing patients to obsess over aches that other people simply toler-

118
Conrad, supra note 112, at 105; see also Kaufman, supra note 109 (“[F]ederal officials want to explore whether hormone therapies and their producers have encouraged women to believe menopause is a condition to be treated, rather than an inevitable and natural set
of changes to be managed.”).
119
Shankar & Subish, supra note 105, at 276.
120
Jutel, supra note 43, at 281 (quoting R. Aronowitz, When Do Symptoms Become a
Disease?, 134 ANNALS OF INTERNAL MED. 9, pt. 2, 803 (2001)).
121
Id. at 285.
122
Fibromyalgia
Definition,
MERRIAM-WEBSTER’S
MED.
DICTIONARY,
http://www.merriam-webster.com/medical/fibromyalgia (last visited Feb. 4, 2012).
123
Barker, supra note 116, at 133.
124
Id. at 133–34.
125
Peter Conrad, The Experience of Illness, in THE SOCIOLOGY OF HEALTH & ILLNESS:
CRITICAL PERSPECTIVES, supra note 110, at 130, 130.
126
Id.
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127

ate.”
In fact, Dr. Frederick Wolfe, the lead author of the seminal paper
that first defined the diagnostic criteria for FMS, is “cynical and discouraged about the diagnosis . . . [and] now considers the condition a physical
128
response to stress, depression, and economic and social anxiety.” He explained that “[s]ome of us in those days thought that we had actually identified a disease, which this clearly is not . . . . To make people ill, to give
129
them an illness, was the wrong thing.”
The New York Times reported,
however, that “[d]octors who specialize in treating [FMS] say that the disorder is undertreated and that its sufferers have been stigmatized as chronic
130
complainers.”
Accordingly, disease-branding reduces the stigma associ131
ated with this condition and helps legitimize it as a medical condition.
The most prominent reason for the FMS controversy is its “biomedical invisibility” because there are neither objective indicators nor diagnos132
tic tests for the disease. Although “the American College of Rheumatol133
ogy established criteria for the classification of FMS in 1990,” there is
still no specific and conclusive diagnostic test, so doctors make a diagnosis
134
by evaluating subjective symptoms. Thus,
the biomedical uncertainty about FMS stands in sharp contrast to the
subjective experiences of individuals diagnosed with FMS. . . . The
outcome of this paradox for many with FMS is that they find themselves in an epistemological purgatory in which they question their own
sanity precisely because of their certainty about the realness of their
135
experience in the face of public doubt.

The “epistemological purgatory” is where pharmaceutical companies
thrive—and where the FDA is properly absent. The FDA’s role in diseasecreation is outside the scope of its legislative mandate; the Agency only
127
Alex Berenson, Drug Approved. Is Disease Real? N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 14, 2008),
http://www.nytimes.com/2008/01/14/health/14pain.html?_r=1&pagewanted=all.
128
Id.
129
Id.
130
Id.
131
The president of the National Fibromyalgia Association proclaimed that “[t]he day
that the F.D.A. approved a drug and we had a public service announcement, my pain became real to people.” Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
132
Barker, supra note 116, at 134; see also About Fibromyalgia, NAT’L FIBROMYALGIA
ASS’N, http://www.fmaware.org/PageServerded3.html?pagename=fibromyalgia (last visited
Feb. 4, 2012) (“Unlike a disease, which is a medical condition with a specific cause or causes and recognizable signs and symptoms, a syndrome is a collection of signs, symptoms,
and medical problems that tend to occur together but are not related to a specific, identifiable cause.” (emphasis added)).
133
Barker, supra note 116, at 134.
134
See FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., LIVING WITH FIBROMYALGIA, DRUGS APPROVED TO
MANAGE
PAIN
2
(2008),
available
at
http://www.fda.gov/
downloads/ForConsumers/ConsumerUpdates/ucm107805.pdf.
135
Barker, supra note 116, at 134.
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regulates the advertising of drugs, not the authenticity of diseases. Pharmaceutical companies exploit this opportunity through their advertising
power in order to construct knowledge about the existence and reality of
136
the disease and promote their newly approved drug treatment.
Furthermore, the history of flibanserin and FSD/HSDD provides a
unique illustration of the interrelationship between medicalization and the
pharmaceutical industry. Flibanserin’s origin is as an unintended side effect of a treatment for an unrelated disease. Essentially, it demonstrates the
interplay between research, development, and marketing tactics as a drug
developed for one purpose can be marketed as a treatment for another disease:
Studies of [flibanserin] showed it didn’t work well as an antidepressant
but showed that it didn’t appear to damp sexual desire as some antidepressants do. The FDA said antidepressant studies showed flibanserin
was superior to placebo and a comparator drug with respect to a question about “how strong is your sex drive” on a sexual-experience scale.
That finding led Boehringer Ingelheim to develop the product as a
137
treatment for women with HSDD.

Another crucial observation concerns how the name of the disease changed
from FSD to HSDD. The history of the disease shows that “it was a convergence of pharmaceutical companies, urologists closely associated with
th[e] industry, and media-savvy sex therapists . . . which resulted in the
138
creation and promotion of a diagnosis of ‘female sexual dysfunction.’”
One scholar noted how “[t]he unnoticed shift in 2004 in FSD identity and
promotion from female sexual arousal disorder to hypoactive sexual desire
disorder is another hallmark moment in the FSD story, illustrating how the
effort to match up some drug with FSD moved freely among symptoms and
139
labels.”
Industry-invented diseases exist and continue to proliferate due to the
pervasive effect of medicalization. Medicalizing normal conditions into
treatable diseases is the undercurrent upon which some prescription drugs
drift into the marketplace. Because medicalization is a sociological mech-

136

See infra Part IV.B.1.c (illustrating the promotional strategies used by various DTC
drug ads). Interestingly, promotional practices can sometimes precede FDA approval when
pharmaceutical companies brand diseases and physicians create new diagnostic criteria listing symptoms of the disease that the drug will be able to treat. See Cohen, supra note 115,
at 277 (“[P]romotion of a drug by its manufacturers may actually precede the clinical trials .
. . . The promotion may involve funding professional committees working on the creation of
a new psychiatric diagnostic category listing specific target symptoms, treatment of which
the new drug is then expected to improve.”).
137
Dooren, FDA Questions, supra note 24.
138
Jutel, supra note 43, at 292.
139
Tiefer, supra note 26, at 4.
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anism, it is outside the FDA’s jurisdiction; it is an unregulated yet effective
instrument within the drug companies’ marketing toolbox.
C. How Drug Companies Advertise: Explaining the
Disease-Branding/Drug-Mongering Strategy
Critics condemn the pharmaceutical industry for its promotional practices of medicalizing non-disease conditions in order to create new markets
140
for drug treatments.
Disease-branding turns “ordinary ailments into
medical problems, see[s] mild symptoms as serious, treat[s] personal problems as medical ones, see[s] risks as diseases, and frame[s] prevalence es141
timates to increate potential markets.”
Disease-branding convinces
healthy people they are sick, while drug-mongering convinces these new142
found patients that they need drugs.
Havidol is a realistic parody of a disease-branding and drugmongering campaign; although fictitious and satirical, it is nevertheless
representative of the promotional practice. Australian artist Justine Cooper
created a DTC advertising campaign to promote the fake drug Havidol to
treat the farcical disease Dysphoric Social Attention Consumption Deficit
143
Anxiety Disorder.
According to its website and prescribing information,
Havidol is “the only known medication available for this newly recognized
144
145
disorder.” The public response to the exhibit has been surprising. The
exhibit, which includes a mock website and television and print advertisements, is so believable that people think it is an authentic DTC advertising
146
campaign. A review of the exhibit describes Havidol as

140

E.g., NIKOLAS ROSE, THE POLITICS OF LIFE ITSELF: BIOMEDICINE, POWER, AND
SUBJECTIVITY IN THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY 2 (2007) (“Pharmaceutical companies have
been singled out for particular criticism, accused of selling many new drugs at inflated prices and with false promises, ignoring potentially dangerous side effects, and medicalizing
nondisease conditions such as baldness or lack of libido to create new markets in the ruthless pursuit of shareholder value.” (citations omitted)).
141
Shankar & Subish, supra note 105, at 275.
142
Id.
143
Fake Drug, Fake Illness—and People Believe It!, REUTERS, Feb. 16, 2007, available
at http://www.reuters.com/article/2007/02/16/us-drug-fake-idUSL165119520070216 [hereinafter Fake Drug, Fake Illness—and People Believe It!].
144
Understanding Havidol, HAVIDOL, http://www.havidol.com/understanding.html (last
visited Feb. 4, 2012).
145
Consumers Fall for Havidol Pharmaceutical Parody that Promotes a Fictitious Anxiety Disorder, NAT. NEWS.COM (Mar. 1, 2007), http://www.naturalnews.com/021660.html
[hereinafter Consumers Fall for Havidol Parody].
146
Fake Drug, Fake Illness—and People Believe It!, supra note 143; see also Marylyn
Donahue,
When
Branding
is
Art,
PHARM. EXEC.
(Oct.
15,
2007),
http://pharmexec.findpharma.com/pharmexec/article/articleDetail.jsp?id=465558&sk=&dat
e=&&pageID=1 (discussing the trade magazine Pharmaceutical Executive’s response to the
Havidol campaign).
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a frightening approximation of the real thing. Parody gives way to possibility as Cooper recreates the entire drug marketing process—from
the invention of a new disorder (wherein a need is first found and then
the disorder is penned) to the branding process of naming the drug, its
pill and logo design, promotional merchandise, and finally its website,
147
TV and print advertisements.

Cooper, commenting on her exhibit and the “comedic” nature of real drug
advertisements, states: “I couldn’t be outrageously spoofy so I really wanted it to be a more subtle kind of parody that draws you in, makes you want
this thing and then makes you wonder why you want it and maybe where
148
you can get it.” This strategy for a successful parody parallels the actual
149
DTC advertising strategy used in pharmaceutical promotional practices.
Critics of this strategy would reject the arguably comedic nature of these
commercials because the fact that viewers were persuaded that they have a
fake disease and need a fake drug treatment demonstrates just how easily
pharmaceutical companies can succeed in marketing legitimate, albeit con150
troversial, diseases and drugs.
Dr. Carl Elliot explains that disease-branding works very well in two
151
situations: (1) “the shameful condition that can be destigmatized” and (2)
152
“a condition that can be plausibly portrayed as under-diagnosed.”
Dur147

Justine
Cooper,
Havidol,
DANEYAL
MAHMOOD
GALLERY,
http://daneyalmahmood.com/ArtistsPages/Justine/PastExhibitions/JustineHavidol.html (last
visited Feb. 4, 2012).
148
Fake Drug, Fake Illness—and People Believe It!, supra note 143.
149
For a description of various drug DTC advertising strategies, see infra Part IV.B.1.c.
150
For a discussion of the “outrageousness” of DTC advertising, see infra Part IV.B.1.b.
If Havidol were real and provided a safe and effective remedy, then the FDA should approve it because it is inappropriate paternalism for the FDA to prevent this drug from entering the market based on the controversy surrounding the existence of the disease. Doctors
and patients, in an informative, interactive process, should determine the utility of the drug
for each patient’s individual needs. For discussion of Academic Detailing as a way to
strengthen this interactive process, see supra Part IV.C.
151
Elliott, supra note 14.
For instance, when Pharmacia launched Detrol in the late 1990s, the condition the drug treated was known to doctors as “urge incontinence.” Patients
called it “accidentally peeing in my pants” and were embarrassed to bring it
up with their physicians. Pharmacia fixed the problem by rebranding the
condition as “overactive bladder.”
Id.
152
Id.
Branding such a condition assures potential patients that they are part of a
large and credible community of sufferers. For example, in 1999, the FDA
approved the antidepressant Paxil for the treatment of “social anxiety disorder,” a condition previously known as “shyness.” In order to convince shy
people they had social anxiety disorder, GlaxoSmithKline, the maker of Paxil, hired a PR firm . . . [to] put together a public awareness campaign called
“Imagine being allergic to people.”
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ing the process of DTC advertising, diseases and drugs become “adjec153
tival.”
A psychological connection between disease and drug develops
when symptoms (e.g., inability to achieve or maintain an erection or high
cholesterol levels) are medicalized into disease-like states (e.g., erectile
dysfunction or hyperlipidemia/hypercholesterolemia) because the disease
becomes synonymous and psychologically associated with the advertised
154
drug treatment (e.g., Viagra or Lipitor).
An inextricable link develops
between the disease and the drug in the minds of consumers when a branded disease is attached to a brand name drug; it is the essence of pharmaceutical promotional practices.
Although “consumption of medical and pharmaceutical products is it155
self shaped by brand images and brand loyalty,” disease-branding is a
distinct concept from advertising the brand of the drug (i.e., drugmongering) because disease-branding creates a brand for the disease itself.
Used together, however, they create a truly effective pharmaceutical promotional campaign as disease-awareness ads become inextricably linked in
156
consumers’ minds with the brand name drug that treats the disease.
Pharmaceutical marketing aimed at destigmatizing conditions so that
people feel comfortable seeking help can promote the public health; thus,
the FDA will allow this form of promotion as long as the drug continues to
be safe and effective and the drug’s DTC advertising complies with federal
157
statutes and regulations. Nevertheless, although this practice can be pos-

Id.
153

SUSAN SONTAG, ILLNESS AS METAPHOR AND AIDS AND ITS METAPHORS 58 (1989).
See generally Tanuja Singh & Donnavieve Smith, Direct-to-Consumer Prescription
Drug Advertising: A Study of Consumer Attitudes and Behavioral Intentions, 22 J.
CONSUMER MKTG. 369 (2005) (analyzing consumers’ perceptions of DTC drug advertisements and requests for brand name drugs); Tim Scott et al., Killing Me Softly: Myth in
Pharmaceutical Advertising, 329 BRIT. MED. J. 1484 (2004) (examining how drug advertisements use visual and linguistic imagery to create associations between diseases and
products).
155
ROSE, supra note 140, at 30.
156
See U.S. FOOD AND DRUG ADMIN., DRAFT GUIDANCE FOR INDUSTRY: “HELP-SEEKING”
AND OTHER DISEASE AWARENESS COMMUNICATIONS BY OR ON BEHALF OF DRUG AND DEVICE
FIRMS
6
(2004),
available
at
http://www.fda.gov/downloads/Drugs/GuidanceComplianceRegulatoryInformation/Guidanc
es/ucm070068.pdf (“Psychology and marketing research suggests that the greater the perceptual similarity between disease awareness communications and reminder or product
claim promotions . . . the more likely it is that the separate messages contained in the two
pieces will be remembered together in memory as one entity.” (citation omitted)).
157
Id. at 3. Disease-awareness communication is not subject to risk-disclosure requirements; however, “in other situations where a supposed disease awareness communication is
determined to, by implication, identify a particular drug . . . the communication can be considered labeling or advertising and can therefore be subject to regulation by FDA.” Id.
154
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itive, it can simultaneously be extremely harmful as it “turns healthy people
158
into patients, wastes precious resources, and causes iatrogenic harm.”
IV. A CASE STUDY OF LEGAL AND LEGISLATIVE REMEDIES FOR
PHARMACEUTICAL PROMOTIONAL PRACTICES
A. The FDA’s Role in Defining Disease and Regulating
Disease-Branding
The FDA’s mandate, according to the FD&C Act and its accompanying legislative history, is to approve drugs that are safe and effective for
159
their intended use.
The role of the FDA vis-á-vis the pharmaceutical industry is to act as a regulatory gate-keeper by determining which drugs en160
ter the market.
The FDA approves a drug for market if it is safe and effective for its intended use; therefore, it is an inappropriate expansion of its
grant of authority for the FDA to consider the legitimacy of diseases. The
FDA is an active gate-keeper and regulator of the pharmaceutical industry,
but not a paternalistic agency or a national scientific arbiter of disease classification. The critique that the pharmaceutical industry is economically
exploiting the public by turning Americans into medical consumers need
not concern the FDA as this is beyond its legislative mandate. Thus, while
disease-branding may be a valid critique of the drug industry, it should not
implicate the FDA because the Agency regulates neither diseases nor doctors’ treatment of these diseases. The FDA approves drugs as safe and effective in order to provide doctors with an arsenal of treatment options;
doctors ultimately make the treatment decision by determining whether a
161
particular patient suffers from a disease and how to best treat that patient.
The limited scope of the FDA’s role in defining disease depends on a
multifaceted consideration of its legislative mandate—promoting and protecting the public health—juxtaposed against the social, political, and medical milieu: what drugs pharmaceutical companies are developing and for
what conditions, what advisory committees are recommending, and how
patient advocacy groups are responding. As mentioned above, the FDA
does play some role in defining, or legitimizing, diseases because the per162
ception of the disease may shape the regulatory approval process.
A
drug’s risk-benefit calculus is dependent on the FDA’s perception of the
158

Moynihan & Henry, supra note 29, at 425.
See supra Part II.B.
160
See Carpenter, supra note 67, at 404.
161
See 21 U.S.C. § 396 (2006) (“Nothing in this Act shall be construed to limit or interfere with the authority of a health care practitioner to prescribe or administer any legally
marketed device to a patient for any condition or disease within a legitimate health care
practitioner-patient relationship.”).
162
See supra Part II.B (discussing accelerated product review and orphan-drug status).
159
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disease, the drug’s intended use, and the treatment population. For example, the FDA must consider whether a drug cures cancer, baldness, or shyness and whether these cures have risks, including morbidity and mortality,
because these factors alter the drug’s respective risk-benefit profiles for approval purposes. An effective cure for a deadly cancer with potentially lethal side effects has a high efficacy rating, and although the risk of death
gives the drug a low safety rating, the overall risk-benefit profile weighs in
favor of approval for a specific patient population because of the drug’s
positive effect on the cancer’s mortality rate. By contrast, an effective
baldness or shyness cure that is associated with a high risk of death may
have a high efficacy rating, but its overall public health benefit of curing
these benign conditions cannot outweigh the high risk of death associated
with the treatment. Thus the risk is probably so high that the overall riskbenefit profile weighs in favor of rejection. In addition, FDA regulators
(the individuals rather than the institutional entity) are social beings who
can be influenced by the medicalization of disease-branding. If they consider the disease more severe than it actually is or are persuaded by diseaseawareness ads and other forms of disease promotion that a normal condition ought to be treated, they may be more inclined to give less weight to
adverse events associated with a drug intended to treat the industry163
invented disease in their risk-benefit calculus.
Regardless of the FDA’s limited purpose in defining diseases for the
approval process, it has no role in regulating disease-branding strategies
164
beyond ensuring that the advertisements are not false or misleading.
Advertisements can shape the public’s perception of a disease and encourage treatment with a drug, while complying fully with the FD&C Act and
165
its regulations.
Because these promotional practices do not violate the
regulatory scheme instituted to prevent the adulteration and misbranding of
drugs, critics of these practices are left without a viable administrative tool
to remedy the problems that stem from these practices.

163
For example, Pfizer’s NDA for Viagra convinced the FDA that erectile dysfunction is
severe enough and the benefits of Viagra are sufficient to outweigh the risks of the drug.
See Approval Letter from Robert Temple, Dir., Office of Drug Evaluation, Ctr. for Drug
Evaluation & Research, to Sandra J. Croak-Brossman, Pfizer Pharms. Prod. Corp. Ltd.
(Mar.
27,
2010),
available
at
http://www.accessdata.fda.gov/
drugsatfda_docs/appletter/1998/20895ltr.pdf. But see supra notes 22–23 and accompanying
text (explaining that Boehringer Ingelheim could not convince the Advisory Panel that
HSDD was sufficiently severe, and that the benefits of flibanserin were great enough, to
outweigh the drug’s adverse side effects).
164
It seems difficult to prove that disease-branding could be considered misleading in
violation of 21 C.F.R. § 202.1(e)(3) because there is justified medical science supporting the
legitimacy of the disease, regardless of any surrounding controversy.
165
See supra Part II.C (describing how DTC broadcast advertising generally complies
with the federal regulatory scheme).
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B. Legal Remedies: Possible Causes of Action for Disease-Branding
and Drug-Mongering
The determination whether an ailment is a disease is a complex, so166
cially constructed process.
Although it may have implications for FDA
approval, it should be reiterated that the FDA’s regulatory function in determining what constitutes a drug is purely statutory interpretation and that
the Agency’s decision to approve a drug for the market is based on its
167
evaluation of the safety and efficacy of the drug’s intended use. Because
the disease-branding and drug-mongering advertising strategies appear, as a
general matter, to be legal and in compliance with the FD&C Act, it seems
that there are no statutory or regulatory bars to this form of pharmaceutical
promotion. If labeling and DTC advertising are legal, an argument that
drug companies are misbranding in violation of the Act will fail.
Thus, if the FDA does not have jurisdiction in this area because the
overall strategy complies with federal drug laws and disease-branding by
Big Pharma continues unabated by regulatory restrictions (provided that the
advertisements remain compliant), then what is left of the critique of disease-branding and drug-mongering? Because the argument that this practice harms society and public health is still valid from the sociology-ofhealth perspective, this Comment considers whether there are any legal
remedies available for people who suffer injuries as a result of these practices. Relying on the sociology-of-health and medicalization frameworks,
critics can use expert testimony from sociology, consumer-psychology, and
medical scholarship to provide evidence that the promotional practices are
tortious. Consequently, it seems that the critics’ only option to hold pharmaceutical companies liable for the arguably egregious practices of disease-branding and drug-mongering would be to file a test case in which a
plaintiff with standing sues a drug company in tort for intentional infliction
of emotional distress (IIED) or negligent infliction of emotional distress
(NIED) or sues his or her doctors for medical malpractice, which, in a circuitous way, could affect drug companies’ advertising practices.
It is crucial to note at the outset that the fact that these drugs have
been approved by the FDA does not exempt drug companies from liabil168
ity.
Because FDA approval does not preempt state-law tort claims for
drugs approved through the NDA process, compliance with the FD&C Act
169
is not necessarily a safe-harbor or a complete defense to tort claims.
Accordingly, the Supreme Court held in Wyeth v. Levine that brand name drug

166

For a discussion of the social construction of disease, see supra Part III.B.
See supra Part II.B (discussing the role of the FDA as a regulatory agency that approves drugs for market if they are safe and effective for their intended use).
168
See Wyeth v. Levine, 129 S. Ct. 1187, 1204 (2009).
169
Id. at 1191.
167
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companies are amenable to suit under state tort law.
Thus, even if drug
companies comply with the rules and regulations for DTC advertising,
plaintiffs will not be preempted from suing them for disease-branding and
drug-mongering advertising campaigns if these claims fit into state negligence regimes. The following sections analyze potential claims for IIED,
NIED, and medical malpractice.
1.

Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress (IIED)
171

Havidol, the brilliant parody of prescription drug advertising, can
172
act as a hypothetical case study for the possibility of an IIED claim.
One
article commented how the “media exhibit featuring a campaign for a fake
drug to treat a fictitious illness is causing a stir because some people think
173
the illness is real.”
Another article asked, “What happens if you create a
fake disorder and offer a fake drug to treat it? You get thousands of people
174
fooled that they might have an invented disease.”
If an artist can convince ordinary people that they have a purely imaginary disease that could
be treated with a fictional drug, then surely an otherwise healthy and reasonable person could be convinced that he or she suffers from an industryinvented disease that can be treated by the pharmaceutical company’s real
drug bearing an FDA-stamp-of-approval. Thus, a crucial legal question
emerges as to whether this conduct is sufficiently outrageous to support a
cause of action.
The tort of IIED may provide a viable cause of action that could be
used to challenge these pharmaceutical promotional practices, and which
175
176
would not be preempted under Wyeth.
IIED is a relatively recent tort,
170

Id. at 1202 (“In keeping with Congress’ decision not to pre-empt common-law tort
suits, it appears that the FDA traditionally regarded state law as a complementary form of
drug regulation.”). Contra PLIVA, Inc. v. Mensing, 131 S. Ct. 2567 (2011) (holding that
federal drug regulations applicable to generic drugs preempt state tort claims).
171
See supra notes 143–44 and accompanying text.
172
Although Future Pharms, Inc., the manufacturer of Havidol, is not amenable to a lawsuit because fictitious defendants cannot be served with process, the evidence that consumers legitimately believe that the invented disease and drug are real reveals consumers’ propensity to be influenced by pharmaceutical advertising.
173
Fake Drug, Fake Illness—and People Believe It!, supra note 143.
174
Consumers Fall for Havidol Parody, supra note 145 (emphasis added).
175
If the test-case plaintiff has not suffered physical injury, IIED would be the only legal
recourse because the other negligence-based torts require physical impact or injury. See infra Part IV.B.2 (discussing NIED).
176
Karen Markin, The Truth Hurts: Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress as a
Cause of Action Against the Media, 5 COMM. L. & POL’Y 469, 472 (2000) (citing State Rubbish Collectors Ass’n v. Siliznoff, 240 P.2d 282, 337 (Cal. 1952)) (showing that California
was the first state to recognize IIED as a cause of action); see also 4 NEIL M. LEVY ET AL.,
CALIFORNIA TORTS § 44.01 (2011) (describing how the first California court to recognize
IIED as an independent cause of action viewed the tort as protecting the right to be free
from invasions of “emotional and mental tranquility”).
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and, although every state recognizes it as an independent cause of action,
178
the area of law is unsettled. Even if courts have yet to recognize an IIED
179
claim premised on disease-branding and drug-mongering, this does not
mean that such a claim would be precluded, and thus should not deter critics from exploring the possibility of filing a complaint.
There is at least one reported case analyzing an IIED claim that is
premised on a patient watching television, which can be used as a founda180
tion to develop the test case.
In Brinkman v. Shiley, Inc., a patient received a heart-valve replacement, and after watching a television program
discussing incidents of the valve malfunctioning, experienced severe emo181
tional distress. Although the court held that plaintiff’s emotional distress
182
was related to the show’s content and not to the defective device, this
situation is clearly distinguishable from the test case. The fear associated
with watching a television news show that is not affiliated with a drug
company and is intended to inform the viewer is different from the fear resulting from watching a drug-company-created and sponsored advertising
campaign (which, arguably, is intended to induce a sense of fear or “health
183
anxiety” in consumers to persuade viewers to purchase their drugs).
a. Elements of an IIED Cause of Action
According to the Restatement (Second) of Torts, the prima facie case
for “outrageous conduct causing severe emotional distress” (better known
as IIED) is satisfied when a plaintiff alleges that a defendant, “by extreme
and outrageous conduct[,] intentionally or recklessly causes severe emo184
tional distress to another.”
Recovery is possible for “mental distress or
disturbance . . . even in the absence of physical injury or any other actiona185
ble injury.”
First, “[t]he element of moral outrage may well be the critical ele186
ment.”
The plaintiff must allege that the defendant’s conduct was extreme, which is satisfied “only if the defendant’s conduct is so outrageous

177

Markin, supra note 176, at 472 n.17 (collecting cases).
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 46 cmt. c (1965) (“The law is still in a stage of
development, and the ultimate limits of this tort are not yet determined.”).
179
As of March 2012, no reported cases on LexisNexis contain the phrase “disease
branding” or “drug mongering.”
180
732 F. Supp. 33, 33 (M.D. Pa. 1989).
181
Id.
182
Id. at 35.
183
See infra Part IV.B.1.b (discussing hypochondria and health anxiety).
184
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 46(1) (1965) (emphasis added).
185
13 LOUIS R. FRUMER & MELVIN I. FRIEDMAN, PERSONAL INJURY—ACTIONS,
DEFENSES, DAMAGES § 55A.02 (2011).
186
Id.
178
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in character, and so extreme in degree, as to go beyond all possible grounds
of decency, that it must be regarded as atrocious and utterly intolerable in a
187
civilized community.”
According to the Restatement, “the recitation of
the facts to an average member of the community would arouse his resent188
ment against the actor, and lead him to exclaim, ‘Outrageous!’”
Here,
the role of “applied psychology” is imperative because marketingpsychology experts can interpret advertising campaigns and give expert testimony about the causal link between disease-branding and drug189
mongering tactics and the resulting emotional distress.
The distress
could be characterized as the psychological manipulation of an otherwise
healthy person into believing that he or she has a disease that is treatable
with drugs, coupled with the iatrogenic harm resulting from this pharmaceutical treatment that the patient would not have experienced had the patient not been convinced that he or she needed the drug. Moreover, although consumers would not be shocked to learn that the drug companies
advertise to make a profit, they could be shocked to learn that the drug
companies are inventing diseases and convincing healthy people that they
are sick; this could very well cross the threshold from persuasive advertising tactics to outrageous marketing behavior. Accordingly, the quest for
profit fails to address or identify the issue; attention in evaluating the extreme or outrageous conduct, which is the necessary element of the cause
of action, should be focused on the means, not the ends.
Second, in order for conduct to be considered intentional or reckless,
the plaintiff must show that the defendant “intended his specific conduct
and knew or should have known that emotional distress would likely re190
sult.” It is important to note that
[a]ctual intent to cause emotional distress is not necessary, because the
willful wrongdoer is charged with the duty of foreseeing the mental and
emotional consequences that would naturally flow from his or her conduct. If the actor did not undertake the offensive conduct for the purpose of causing the harm received, proof of the intent of the actor to
187
Id.; see also John J. Kircher, The Four Faces of Tort Law: Liability for Emotional
Harm, 90 MARQ. L. REV. 789, 799 (2007) (citing RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 46
cmt. d (1965)).
188
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 46 cmt. d (1965).
189
For example, in United States v. 38 Dozen Bottles, More or Less, Labeled in Part
Tryptacin, 114 F. Supp. 461 (D. Minn. 1953), the federal district court judge qualified two
experts in the field of advertising and marketing psychology to testify whether drugs were
misbranded in violation of the FD&C Act. The judge explained that the witnesses “presented exhaustive analyses of the content of the advertisement and the effect which it was intended to have upon the prospective purchaser of the drug.” Id. at 462; accord Applied Psychology in Action: Legal Status of Advertising and Marketing Psychology Experts, 38 J.
APPLIED PSYCHOLOGY 276, 276 (1954) (discussing the same case).
190
Womack v. Eldridge, 210 S.E.2d 145, 148 (Va. 1974). This was the first time when
the Virginia Supreme Court recognized the cause of action for IIED.
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cause that harm may nevertheless be implied by evidence of circumstances showing that the conduct was of a nature that reasonably should
191
have been recognized as likely to cause the harm sustained.

Finally, the emotional distress “must be reasonably foreseeable and
justified under the circumstances, attributing to the plaintiff the sensibility
192
of a reasonable person,” unless the defendant knew or took advantage of
193
plaintiff’s “peculiar susceptibility to emotional distress.”
Because several cases rely on this standard to evaluate IIED claims,
analyzing them is important to understand how they would apply in the test
case. In a federal case in Pennsylvania, Michtavi v. United States, the
plaintiff was a prisoner who alleged that his fellow inmates attempted to
scam him and, as a result, he suffered from depression, which required
194
treatment with the prescription medication Prozac.
Plaintiff’s IIED
195
claim, based on the Restatement (Second) of Torts’ definition, failed because the court concluded that the plaintiff did not allege any conduct that
196
was sufficiently extreme or outrageous.
Michtavi is a clear example of
the high burden that plaintiffs must meet in order to successfully bring an
action for IIED.
In Estate of Duckett v. Cable News Network, LLLP, a federal court
applying Florida law recognized that conduct involving the use of television broadcasts could rise to the level of extreme and outrageous con197
duct.
The court noted, however, that a successful claim for IIED under
Florida law is extremely rare, as only ten reported cases were found in
which a judgment was entered for a successful plaintiff and affirmed on

191

13 FRUMER & FRIEDMAN, supra note 185, § 55A.02 (emphasis added).
Id.
193
Id.
194
No. 4:07-CV-0628, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 18926, at *6–8 (M.D. Pa. Mar. 4, 2009),
aff’d, 345 F. App’x. 727 (3d Cir. 2009).
195
Id. at *20 n.7 (“The Pennsylvania Supreme Court has not expressly recognized a
cause of action for intentional infliction of emotional distress, but has consistently held that,
if this cause of action were recognized, the Restatement would set forth the minimum elements necessary to state such a claim.”).
196
Id. at *22. But see Chuy v. Phila. Eagles Football Club, 595 F.2d 1265 (3d Cir. 1979)
(applying Pennsylvania law and holding that the knowing release of false information that a
player was suffering from a fatal disease by a professional football team’s doctor could constitute outrageous conduct for the purposes of IIED); Johnson v. Caparelli, 625 A.2d 668
(Pa. Super. Ct. 1993) (holding that a priest’s sexual molestation of an altar boy constituted
the same, although the claim was ultimately rejected on other grounds); Field v. Phila. Elec.
Co., 565 A.2d 1170 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1989) (holding that an energy company deliberately
venting radioactive steam on an employee and concealing the extent of exposure constituted
the same).
197
No. 5:06-cv-44, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 88667, at *21–23 (M.D. Fla. July 31, 2008);
see also Brinkman v. Shiley, Inc., 732 F. Supp. 33, 33 (M.D. Pa. 1989) (discussing an IIED
claim premised on media broadcasts).
192
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198

appeal.
In other words, “a cause of action for intentional infliction of
emotional distress is one thing, avoiding summary judgment or prevailing
199
at trial is quite another.” In this case, defendants CNN and Nancy Grace,
the star and moderator of the Nancy Grace show, recorded a telephone in200
terview with Duckett after her child went missing.
The interview was
scheduled to be televised the following day, but hours before the show was
to air, Duckett committed suicide. After the defendant aired the interview,
Duckett’s parents began suffering from severe and debilitating emotional
201
distress. The plaintiffs successfully alleged at the pleading stage that the
decision to air the show following their daughter’s suicide was sufficiently
202
extreme and outrageous conduct to state a cause of action for IIED.
In Lamothe v. Russell, a Connecticut state court denied defendant’s
motion to strike the complaint for IIED in an employment context when the
203
allegation included disparaging remarks about health problems.
Under
Connecticut law, the court held that sufficiently extreme and outrageous
conduct had occurred when an employer constantly belittled the plaintiff by
204
telling her that she had health problems because she was overweight.
Analogously, pharmaceutical companies’ advertising campaigns attempt, in
a way, to belittle healthy consumers by persuading them that they are sick.
Although the Lamothe court distinguished ordinary comments from those
made by people in positions of control, this should not be an obstacle for
the test case plaintiffs because pharmaceutical companies are in a position
of power as experts in the field of drug promotion and marketing.
In Elson v. Consolidated Edison, Co., an employer subjected the employee-plaintiff to eight hours of interrogation, knowing of the employee’s
underlying psychological condition for which he was receiving treat205
ment.
As a result, he suffered mental anguish, and the court concluded
that these facts stated a cause of action for IIED because the conduct com206
plained of could be found to be extreme and outrageous.
Although
pharmaceutical and advertising companies are, or should be, aware of the
existence of hypochondria in the general population, it would be impossible
to plead with particularity that a company knew that the specific plaintiff

198

Estate of Duckett, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 88667, at *14.
Id.
200
Id. at *2–3.
201
Id. at *21.
202
Id. at *22–23.
203
No. CV074022729S, 2009 Conn. Super. LEXIS 775, at *15 (Conn. Super. Ct. Mar.
25, 2009).
204
Id. at *4.
205
641 N.Y.S.2d 294, 294 (N.Y. App. Div. 1996).
206
Id. at 294–95.
199
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207

suffered from hypochondria and was thus extraordinarily susceptible to
suffering extreme emotional distress from disease-branding and drugmongering. Therefore, unlike the Elson defendant, pharmaceutical companies may be able to escape liability because the plaintiff would probably be
unable to prove that the company was aware of the plaintiff’s particular
208
sensitivities and predilection to mental distress.
Because it is clear that the companies intend to produce a disease209
branding and drug-mongering campaign, plaintiff can plead the “specific
210
conduct” necessary for the intentional or recklessness element. Although
the companies know that some consumers would be convinced to seek the
advertised drug, the plaintiff would have to show that the recognition that
one might have a newfound disease is tantamount to experiencing emotional distress. Even though emotional distress can be a consequence of selfdiagnosis that accompanies disease-branding, the plaintiff would need to
allege that this was the logical consequence of seeing the campaign. In
other words, the plaintiff must allege that a drug company intended or
should have known that emotional distress would likely follow from viewing the advertisement, rather than merely showing that learning of a new
disease would result in the consumer experiencing emotional distress.
In California, outrageous conduct that is sustained or persistent and
which affects the plaintiff over an extended period of time is more likely to
211
be considered outrageous than conduct which is short-lived.
In addition,
other cases recognize that individual acts may be insufficient, but the cumulative effect of these acts, when viewed as a pattern or course of con212
duct, could rise to the level of outrageous conduct.
Thus, if one looks at
disease-branding and drug-mongering as a cumulative advertising campaign, rather than counting each time a consumer views a commercial as a
discrete event, it is likely to satisfy California’s duration and cumulativeeffect standard for determining whether alleged conduct is outrageous.
In another Pennsylvania case, Rideout v. Hershey Medical Center, the
plaintiffs’ child was diagnosed with a brain tumor, which they wanted to
207

See infra note 226 and accompany text (discussing hypochondria).
In a class action, however, it might be possible to argue that pharmaceutical companies and their advertising companies had constructive knowledge of general rates of hypochondria such that the court could infer that the defendant took advantage of the plaintiffs’
peculiar susceptibility.
209
See, e.g., Landman, supra note 7; Vince Parry, Disease Branding: What Is It, Why it
Works, and How to Do It—A Win-Win Marketing Strategy that Illuminates, Educates, and
Promotes
at
the
Same
Time,
PHARM.
EXEC.
(Oct.
1,
2007),
http://pharmexec.findpharma.com/pharmexec/Supplements/BrandingDisease/ArticleStandar
d/Article/detail/465561.
210
Womack v. Eldridge, 210 S.E.2d 145, 148 (Va. 1974).
211
LEVY ET AL., supra note 176, § 44.01 & n.55.
212
Id. § 44.01 & n.56.
208
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213

treat aggressively.
Due to the child’s deteriorating condition and likely
imminent demise, however, the hospital’s Ethics Committee decided that
further treatment would be futile and disconnected the child’s ventilator
214
without the parents’ presence.
The parents suffered severe emotional
anguish as a result of hearing over the loudspeaker that the ventilator had
215
been disconnected and subsequently witnessing their daughter’s death.
The hospital argued that the IIED claim failed because the plaintiffs were
not present when the ventilator was disconnected; however, the court concluded that “aural and contemporaneous perception of the removal of the
216
ventilator is sufficient to allege presence.”
Furthermore, the hospital asserted that its decision to disconnect the ventilator “was a thoroughly reasoned exercise of professional judgment and that accordingly, as a matter
217
of law, it did not act outrageously.”
The court held that although the
hospital’s decision to remove life support may have been reasonable, the
conduct could still be considered extreme and outrageous to support a
218
claim for IIED.
Analogously, in the test case, a plaintiff who views the advertisement
on television is “present” in the location where the intentional conduct occurs precisely because he or she perceives aurally and visually the substance of the commercial. In addition, just like in Estate of Duckett, the
plaintiff can witness the advertisements through broadcast media because
there does not seem to be a limiting principle stating that the conduct must
be witnessed live. Moreover, presence is crucial for advertising success;
the defendant pharmaceutical company is not only aware of but intends the
plaintiff’s presence in front of the television in order to view the commercial. In addition, despite the ostensible reasonableness of the drug advertising campaign for legitimate corporate goals of promoting sales and increasing profits, a court using the Rideout standard could still conclude that
disease-branding and drug-mongering conduct is extreme and outrageous.
Disease-Branding and Drug-Mongering as “Outrageous
Conduct”
In order to establish the first element, the plaintiff must allege that
disease-branding and drug-mongering constitute outrageous conduct. The
question is whether the medicalization of arguably ordinary behavior into
symptoms characterizing a disease (i.e., disease-branding) and the psychological manipulation of healthy people to think that they are sick and reb.

213
214
215
216
217
218

30 Pa. D. & C. 4th 57, 59–60 (C.P. Dauphin 1995).
Id. at 61–63.
Id. at 63.
Id. at 69.
Id.
Id.
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quire pharmaceutical treatment (i.e., drug-mongering) are evidence of outrageous conduct. This section argues that drug-mongering, through DTC
advertising campaigns, is probative of the outrageous conduct required to
satisfy a prima facie case for IIED, despite the fact the advertisements otherwise comply with the FD&C Act and accompanying regulations.
Although there is some research on the relationship between DTC ad219
220
vertising and consumer perceptions of drugs, consumer demand, and
221
physician prescribing patterns, there is no research on the psychological
effects of emotional distress associated with disease-branding and drugmongering. Nevertheless, this does not mean that the theory is wrong or
that the alleged conduct is not outrageous; it just requires plaintiffs to overcome the pleading burden by alleging sufficient facts that state a claim for
222
relief that is plausible on its face.
In addition, at least one scholar has evaluated successful IIED claims
223
in the media context.
According to Professor Markin’s article, the majority of successful claims resulted from outrageous “newsgathering behav224
ior.”
Relevant to the test case, however, are “content” claims where the
225
content of the media message is the outrageous conduct.
Although Pro-

219

See Deborah F. Spake & Mathew Joseph, Consumer Opinion and Effectiveness of
Direct-to-Consumer Advertising, 24 J. CONSUMER MKTG. 283, 283 (2007) (“Limited research has been done on the relationship between consumer perceptions of DTC advertising
and its impact on consumer requests for pharmaceutical products.”).
220
See, e.g., Matthew F. Hollon, Direct-to-Consumer Marketing of Prescription Drugs:
Creating Consumer Demand, 281 JAMA 382 (1999) (discussing the effect of DTC advertising on consumer demand for prescription drugs).
221
See, e.g., W.M. Zachry et al., Relationship Between Direct-to-Consumer Advertising
and Physician Diagnosing and Prescribing, 59 AM. J. HEALTH-SYS. PHARMACY 42 (2002)
(discussing the relationship between DTC advertising and physician diagnoses and prescriptions associated with the advertised products).
222
See Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. 1937, 1949 (2009) (explaining the “plausibility”
standard under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a)(2)).
223
See Markin, supra note 176.
224
Id. at 479 (discussing Barrett v. Outlet Broad., Inc., 22 F. Supp. 2d 726 (S.D. Ohio
1997) (holding that a reasonable jury could conclude that defendant-journalist’s invasion of
the plaintiff’s home and the broadcasting of images of the mother’s dead body was extreme
and outrageous conduct)); see also id. at 481 (discussing KOVR-TV v. Superior Court, 37
Cal. Rptr. 2d 431, 435 (Cal. Ct. App. 1995) (“[A] jury could find that a television reporter
who attempts deliberately to manipulate the emotions of young children [by recording an
interview with the children about their neighbors’ murder-suicide] . . . has engaged in conduct ‘so outrageous in character, and so extreme in degree, as to go beyond all possible
bounds of decency . . . .’”)).
225
Markin, supra note 176, at 484 (discussing Murray v. Scholosser, 574 A.2d 1339,
1340 (Conn. Super. Ct. 1990) (denying defendant’s motion to strike plaintiff’s complaint of
IIED when radio host “stated, in reference to the photograph of the named plaintiff, that she
was ‘too ugly to even rate,’ in light of her physical attractiveness and sexual desirability,
and that she had won the ‘dog of the week’ prize consisting of a case of Ken-L-Ration and a
dog collar”); see also id. at 485 (discussing Armstrong v. H&C Commc’ns, Inc., 575 So. 2d
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fessor Markin’s article does not discuss any case of pharmaceutical advertising, this does not preclude a court from concluding that a diseasebranding and drug-mongering allegation entails sufficiently extreme and
outrageous conduct for an IIED claim.
Consider a plaintiff with hypochondria who is subjected to a disease226
branding and drug-mongering advertising campaign.
Hypochondriacs
believe that ordinary physical symptoms are signs of more serious diseas227
es.
It is a psychosomatic disorder, which means that the etiology of the
228
disorder is psychological, but it manifests in physical symptoms.
This
“health anxiety,” which affects up to twenty percent of the population, is a
mental illness in which worrying about potentially getting sick, or confusing minor symptoms for an undiagnosed condition, can result in actual
229
physical sickness.
The primary symptom of hypochondria is “intense
230
fear or anxiety about having a serious disease or health condition,” and
this fear can result from “[t]hinking [that one] ha[s] a disease after reading
231
or hearing about it.”
Although such people may realize that they are exaggerating their symptoms, it is difficult for them to cope, so they seek doctors and treatment. Accordingly, pharmaceutical companies take advantage
of consumers’ propensity for hypochondria by vigorously engaging in disease-branding and drug-mongering and by preying on their health anxieties.

280, 282 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1991) (holding that an evening news broadcast airing gruesome close-up footage of a murdered child’s skull constitutes outrageous conduct)).
226
Although a hypochondriac may not represent a “reasonable” person, if the defendantdrug company knew of plaintiff’s particular susceptibility to hypochondria, the company
could still be liable. See supra text accompanying note 193. Although it might be a dispositive defense to prove that the defendant lacked knowledge of a particular plaintiff’s hypochondria, the availability of the defense does not alter the viability of the prima facie case at
the pleading stage. Thus, although the case may be resolved in defendant’s favor at the
summary judgment stage, the complaint could initially survive a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim. See supra text accompanying note 199.
227
Hypochondria,
MEDLINEP LUS,
http://www.nlm.nih.gov/medlineplus/ency/
article/001236.htm (last updated Jan. 26, 2012); see also DSM-IV-TR, 2000, supra note 3,
at 504–07.
228
Hypochondria—Definition,
MAYO
CLINIC,
http://www.mayoclinic.com/
health/hypochondria/DS00841(last updated Nov. 23, 2010).
229
See, e.g., Today Show: Tips to Overcome Your Medical Fears, BING VIDEOS (Oct. 10,
2010),
http://www.bing.com/videos/watch/video/tips-to-overcome-your-medicalfears/6lrdd5r [hereinafter Today Show].
230
Hypochondria—Symptoms, MAYO CLINIC (Nov. 23, 2010), http://www.mayoclinic.
com/health/hypochondria/DS00841/DSECTION=symptoms [hereinafter Hypochondria—
Symptoms].
231
Id.
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The symptoms of hypochondria are exacerbated by the media, so an
analogy can be drawn to pharmaceutical company’s “disease-awareness”
ads, which implant the idea that potentially minor symptoms represent a
major health concern. The disease-awareness or help-seeking ads are a
form of disease-branding that “involves using public awareness campaigns
233
in the media to encourage people to seek new treatments.”
Accordingly,
there is a thin line between promoting knowledge of diseases and the drug234
mongering that is associated with branding diseases.
As such, diseasebranding “is the most insidious of the various forms that medical advertis235
ing . . . can take.”
Moreover, the symptoms that ordinarily accompany experiencing
236
stress (e.g., fast heart beat, headache, and gastrointestinal problems) are
readily confused with symptoms of very serious diseases such as heart dis237
ease, brain tumor, and stomach cancer.
Accordingly, the advertising
campaigns that rely on fear mongering to brand diseases—commercials
that are extremely stress-inducing—can worsen a consumer’s ordinary
stress levels into a full-blown episode of hypochondria. The purpose of inducing episodes of hypochondria is to motivate the consumer-patient to
self-diagnose and seek the prescription drug to treat the advertised disease.
Thus, a crucial component of disease-branding seems to be the utilization
of stress to exacerbate hypochondria. Because DTC advertising exacerbates hypochondria, plaintiffs could plausibly allege that drug companies
capitalize on their particular susceptibility through these promotional strategies.
The outrageous act does not only encompass the exploitation of hypochondriacs; in some cases, the advertisements can be so extreme that an objectively reasonable person (that is, somebody without hypochondria) could
be convinced that he or she suffers from the advertised disease. For example, a reasonable man who experiences rare or occasional sexual problems
could be persuaded that he suffers from the disease of erectile dysfunction

232

See id. (“It’s become easier to search out health information on the Internet in recent
years. Having easy access to information about every possible thing that could be wrong can
fuel your anxiety.”); see also Today Show, supra note 229. (“[Hypochondria is] certainly
prevalent and of course it gets worse depending on the news. . . . [For example,] the skin
cancer warnings in the summer and the breast cancer warnings all the time.”)
233
Shankar & Subish, supra note 105, at 275–76.
234
Id. at 277.
235
Wolinsky, supra note 6, at 612.
236
Stress and Anxiety, TIMES HEALTH GUIDE, http://health.nytimes.com/
health/guides/symptoms/stress-and-anxiety/overview.html#Considerations (last updated
June 16, 2011).
237
See Today Show, supra note 229 (“It’s not that [those with health anxiety] don’t have
physical symptoms, it’s that they misinterpret things. Like if their heart skips a beat it must
be heart disease or a routine headache equals brain tumor.”).
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(ED) and requires pharmacotherapy. Indeed, Pfizer’s DTC advertising
campaign for the ED drug Viagra was an attempt to “ensure that the drug
238
was seen as legitimate therapy for almost any man.”
Because Viagra
was never marketed as a niche drug but rather as a treatment for any man
with subjective perceptions of sexual insecurities, “[t]he perceived preva239
240
lence of ED needed to be expanded” in order to broaden the market.
In this regard, the Viagra website explains that “ED is more common than
241
you think. More than half of men over 40 have some degree of ED.”
This ambiguous statistic focuses on different degrees of ED—some of
which could be considered within the normal range—and expands the definition by medicalizing slight deviations of normal functioning into a “dis242
ease.” Pfizer’s disease-branding and drug-mongering campaign medical243
ized “rare or transitory failures to achieve or maintain erections” into
degrees of ED that could be treated with a prescription for Viagra. Thus, a
reasonable man with a relatively normal sex life could be convinced,
through this DTC broadcasting campaign, that he has a medical condition
requiring pharmaceutical treatment simply because, for example, his penis
244
was “hard enough for penetration but not completely hard.”
The pervasiveness of Viagra’s promotional campaign coupled with the subjectivity of
245
ED symptoms and diagnosis increase the efficacy of—and intensify the
problems associated with—disease-branding and drug-mongering, even for
reasonable, non-hypochondriacs.

238

Joel Lexchin, Bigger and Better: How Pfizer Redefined Erectile Dysfunction, 3 PLOS
MED.
429,
429
(2006),
available
at
http://www.plosmedicine.org/
article/info%3Adoi%2F10.1371%2Fjournal.pmed.0030132 (emphasis added).
239
Id.
240
See, e.g., Elizabeth Lambdin, Note, A New Disease Born Every Minute: The Marketing of Pathology and the Exploitation of Gender-Based Insecurities and Sexuality to Sell
Drugs, 13 CARDOZO J.L. & GENDER 145, 153 (2006).
241
Common Questions—How Can I Tell if it’s Erectile Dysfunction (ED)?, VIAGRA
(Aug. 20, 2010), http://www.viagra.com/questions.aspx#/SD_FCP.1.1/2/ (emphasis added).
242
Even the Viagra website recognizes that transient episodes of abnormal functioning
constitute ED.
Erectile Dysfunction Symptoms, VIAGRA (Aug. 20, 2010),
http://www.viagra.com/about-erectile-dysfunction/erectile-dysfunction-symptoms.aspx
(“[E]rectile dysfunction symptoms can happen just once in a while.”).
243
Lexchin, supra note 238, at 430.
244
The
Erection
Hardness
Score,
VIAGRA
(Aug.
20,
2010),
http://www.viagra.com/about-erectile-dysfunction/erectile-dysfunction-symptoms/erectionhardness-score.aspx (“If you’re concerned about your hardness score, ask your doctor if
VIAGRA can help.”).
245
The “ED Test” is Usually Just a Talk, VIAGRA (Aug. 20, 2010),
http://www.viagra.com/about-erectile-dysfunction/ed-test.aspx (stating that the “ED Test” is
usually just a conversation with your physician about your symptoms).
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DTC Advertisements: Examples and Analysis

DTC broadcast advertisements follow a distinct, almost boilerplate
form, in which a list of vague and common symptoms are described and
linked to a disease (the disease-branding part of the advertisement), followed by the discussion of a prescription drug that will treat this disease
and a recommendation to talk to your doctor to obtain this drug (the drugmongering part of the ad). There is a plethora of DTC commercials that
utilize this form.
Consider, for example, the Requip commercial for Restless Leg Syn246
dome (RLS), which exemplifies this formulaic advertising strategy.
It
opens with a downward angle shot of a woman; with eerie music sounding
in the background, she looks up into the camera and says: “[I]t was so frus247
trating, like a mystery I couldn’t solve.”
After listing symptoms of
“strange sensations” and linking these symptoms to the disease name, the
commercial transitions aurally—the eerie music changes into an ethereal,
delicate, and comforting sound as a doctor discusses a treatment option in
the form of a prescription pharmaceutical.
248
The Zelnorm commercial
for Irritable Bowel Syndrome (IBS) is
also illustrative of the fear-inducement that stems from drug advertising.
The voiceover begins by asking, “[A]re you one of the millions who feel
249
twisted and bloated?” Immediately, the commercial de-stigmatizes and
legitimizes the soon-to-be-mentioned disease and then begins to latch onto
consumer health anxiety by exposing the mystery of the disease: “[I]s your
250
body telling you something is wrong, but you’re not sure why?”
The
commercial then lists symptoms, “abdominal pain or discomfort, bloating
and constipation,” and suggests that you “see your doctor” because “[y]ou
251
may have a medical condition called IBS with constipation.” Many peo252
ple occasionally suffer from IBS symptoms.
Thus, not only does this

246

Requip,
YOUTUBE
(Jan.
5,
2007),
http://www.youtube.com/
watch?v=PL3G1MngqK4.
247
Id.
248
Zelnorm TV Ad (2003), supra note 88. Although Zelnorm was withdrawn from the
market and Amitiza is currently the only FDA-approved drug to treat IBS, Andrew Pollack,
Drug for Irritable Bowel Achieves Goals in Trial, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 14, 2010, at B6, the
Zelnorm commercial still represents a typical example of the disease-branding of IBS. Cf.
Amitiza
Multiple
Plus
Onstar,
YOUTUBE
(Apr.
12,
2009),
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=LsPPwxXVs8w.
249
Zelnorm TV Ad (2003), supra note 88.
250
Id.
251
Id.
252
P.D. Higgins & J.F. Johanson, Epidemiology of Constipation in North America: A
Systematic Review, 99 AM. J. GASTROENTEROLOGY 750 (2004) (“Constipation is very common, as approximately 63 million people in North America meet the Rome II criteria for
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commercial brand the disease through a litany of common symptoms, but
most importantly, it references a prescription drug that treats the disease in
order to legitimize both the disease and the drug treatment by the full
weight of an FDA approval.
Similarly, the Toviaz commercial for overactive bladder (OAB) begins with a voiceover: “Erin wants to get up and go without always worry253
ing about where to go.” The emphasis on “worrying” appears to link the
disease symptoms to the stress and anxiety associated with hypochondria.
One could argue that this is an attempt to exploit potential consumers’ psychological predisposition to hypochondria in order to convince them that
they have a disease and then inform them of the drug that will treat it.
Pharmaceutical companies can also take advantage of ordinary people’s
health anxiety because reasonable consumers (who are not hypochondriacs)
who watch these commercials and identify with the actors’ experience of
vague, common, and ordinary symptoms may logically conclude that they
also have the advertised disease. The commercial continues, “[I]f you have
overactive bladder symptoms, today is the day to talk to your doctor and
254
ask about prescription Toviaz.”
By strengthening the disease-drug connection, this marketing campaign generated a new market niche of patient255
consumers. Upon visiting the website, one learns that the primary symptom of OAB, “urgency,” is a medical condition, rather than a normal bodily
function. To reinforce this notion, the website purposely emphasizes that
“[o]veractive bladder (OAB) is a real medical condition [that is] more
256
common than you may think,” in order to convince the skeptical consumer that the urgent need to urinate is a treatable medical condition.
In addition, the website explains that
[o]ver 33 million men and women in the United States have OAB.
That’s 1 in 6 adults. So if you think you may have OAB, you’re not
alone. OAB is not necessarily a normal part of aging. Prevalence in-

constipation.”); see also infra note 306 and accompanying text (explaining how FMS and
IBS may be related).
253
CR AdWatch: Toviaz, supra note 90.
254
Id.
255
See Anne Landman, Branding Diseases to Sell Cures, PR WATCH BLOG (Oct. 12,
2010, 12:44 PM), http://www.prwatch.org/node/9529 (“By making people think they have a
new condition called ‘overactive bladder,’ the company created a market of 21 million potential patients.”); John Mack, Overactive Bladder: “Pharmacia Instrumental in Creating
New Disease” Says Former VP, PHARMA MKTG. BLOG (Apr. 5, 2009, 8:49 AM),
http://pharmamkting.blogspot.com/2009/04/overactive-bladder-pharmacia.html.
256
What Is Overactive Bladder (OAB)?, TOVIAZ, http://www.toviaz.com/overactivebladder.aspx (last updated Nov. 10, 2011).
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creases as you get older. But the truth is that OAB can affect anyone at
257
any age.

Herein lies the psychological manipulation underlying diseasebranding and drug-mongering: the commercial provides a vague explanation of the symptoms (because everybody sometimes has strong urges to
urinate), and immediately links it to a disease (thus legitimizing and medicalizing the symptoms). Then its accompanying website reinforces the
vague symptoms and suggests that the disease is under-diagnosed and can
affect anyone at any age. Thus, if you merely think you have OAB, then it
is entirely likely that you do because one in six adults have it, and if you
think you experience these symptoms, you should immediately consult
your physician for pharmaceutical treatment.
The Latisse commercials provide another depiction of diseasebranding and drug-mongering. The advertisement begins like a typical
cosmetic commercial for a new mascara product; however, the ad quickly
medicalizes “inadequate or not enough lashes” into “hypotrichosis” using a
combination of loud, upbeat music and stunning close-ups of eyeshadowed
258
eyes with full lashes. Then, Brooke Shields enters the screen asking how
it is possible to grow lashes; she proclaims, “I’m using Latisse, the first and
259
only FDA-approved prescription treatment.”
The advertisement ends
260
with Shields saying, “Ask your doctor if Latisse is right for you,” but
261
then suggests to “find a doctor at Latisse.com today.”
One might question why one’s regular primary-care physician would not diagnose eyelash
hypotrichosis or prescribe Latisse. It seems clear that this statement is an
example of drug-mongering: instead of discussing the condition or drug
with one’s primary care physician, the advertisement suggests that the
drug’s website will allow one to easily find a doctor, presumably affiliated
262
with the drug sponsor, who is more likely to prescribe the drug.
Searching the website for the “Find a Doctor” link reveals the following statement: “While any doctor can prescribe LATISSE®, some may be
more familiar with it than others. When making an appointment, be sure to
263
say that you want to find out more about LATISSE®.”
Clearly, the advertising campaign (including the commercial and the website) is branding
the disease, promoting not just awareness of the condition but the existence
257

How Common Is OAB?, TOVIAZ, http://www.toviaz.com/how-common-is-overactivebladder.aspx (last updated Nov. 10, 2011).
258
Latisse Brooke Shields Commercial, supra note 92.
259
Id.
260
Id.
261
Id.
262
Id.
263
Find a Doctor, LATISSE, http://www.latisse.com/FindaDoctor.aspx?state=18 (last visited Feb. 4, 2012).
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and availability of doctors who will essentially push the drug. The question
is whether it is outrageous conduct to convince the viewer that one has inadequate eyelashes (especially in relation to the eyelash models’ exquisitely long and lush lashes) and is in need of pharmaceutical treatment. In another version, the commercial ends with Claire Danes proclaiming that
Latisse is “from Allergan, a company with sixty years of eye-care exper264
tise.”
This clearly intends to add legitimacy to the product because the
company’s history of eye-care experience should quell any doubts a consumer might have about the company’s ability to manufacture this product.
Critics’ analysis of these commercials is fundamentally flawed. The
Consumer Report AdWatch analyzes the fine-print of the commercial and
explains that Latisse is “[f]or inadequate or not enough lashes, also known
265
as hypotrichosis.”
The report states, “[I]n order to get FDA approval, a
266
drug must be used to diagnose, prevent, treat, or cure a disease.”
As discussed above, one of the definitions of “drug” in the FD&C Act is an arti267
cle “intended to affect the structure or any function of the body of man.”
268
Thus, whether hypotrichosis is a disease is irrelevant; as long as Latisse
is intended to affect the structure of the eyelash, it is a drug and can be
FDA-approved if it is safe and effective for this intended use. Nevertheless, this disease-branding strategy utilizes the hypotrichosis terminology in
order to medicalize what could be considered a normal condition. Due to
the fact that the diagnosis is subjective (the meaning of “not enough eyelashes” is unclear), patients are more comfortable discussing their feelings
of inadequacy with their doctors because it seems more real when it is a
medical condition with an FDA-approved prescription treatment.
Finally, a fibromyalgia public service announcement, ostensibly sponsored by the National Fibromyalgia Association (but co-sponsored by Pfizer, the maker of a fibromyalgia drug), demonstrates the full extent of a disease-branding and drug-mongering campaign. Although it appears to be a
269
help-seeking ad, the public service announcement directs the consumer
to a website sponsored by Pfizer, which contains a link to Pfizer’s Lyrica

264

Latisse—“When Your Lashes Grow, Your Lashes Show” (feat. Claire Danes),
YOUTUBE (July 7, 2010), http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=ZZ1_CQD1jS8.
265
CR AdWatch: Latisse, CONSUMER REPS., http://bcove.me/3cn3q2sx (last visited Feb.
4, 2011).
266
Id.
267
21 U.S.C. § 321(g)(1)(C) (2006).
268
Regardless, according to the International Classification of Diseases (ICD-9-CM) Diagnosis 374.55, eyelash hypotrichosis is the “condition of having inadequate or not enough
eyelashes.” AM. OPTOMETRIC ASS’N CLINICAL CARE GRP., BULLETIN NO. 4, 1 (2009), available at http://www.aoa.org/documents/Latisse-Bulletin-March-18-2009.pdf.
269
For a discussion of the types of DTC advertisements, see supra notes 96–98 and accompanying text.
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270

website.
Thus, this help-seeking ad seems to be a disguised productclaim ad and seems inextricably linked to a DTC drug advertisement, that
271
is, the Lyrica website.
This example is evidence of the scope of Pfizer’s
disease-branding and drug-mongering campaign for fibroymyalgia and
Lyrica.
The public service announcement begins with a quick cut to patients
in visible distress, with tears streaming down their faces, lamenting the in272
tense and inexplicable pain they experience.
The voiceover begins,
“[I]magine feeling this kind of pain and nobody knows what it is or be273
lieves you even have it.”
It continues, “This is fibromyalgia, very real
widespread pain and tenderness that affects millions. . . . There is hope,
there is help. If you’re suffering, talk to your doctor and visit fi274
275
brohope.org.”
After quickly browsing the website, one can find a link
to “Explore a Fibromyalgia Prescription Treatment Option,” which takes
the consumer to “a product-branded Web site from Pfizer,” referring to
Lyrica. Thus, while the commercial and the website are seemingly designed to raise disease awareness, they are inextricably linked to the pre276
scription drug.
270
Facing Fibromyalgia, Finding Hope, supra note 117. Lyrica is the first FDAapproved drug to treat FMS. FDA News Release, FDA Approves First Drug for Treating
Fibromyalgia
(June
21,
2007),
http://www.fda.gov/
NewsEvents/Newsroom/PressAnnouncements/2007/ucm108936.htm.
271
It should be noted that
[w]hen done properly, help-seeking ads are not considered to be drug ads.
Therefore, [FDA] do[es] not regulate true help-seeking ads, but the FTC does
regulate them. If an ad recommends or suggests the use of a specific drug,
however, it is considered a product claim ad that must comply with FDA
rules.
Basics of Drug Ads, supra note 96.
272
Facing Fibromyalgia, Finding Hope, supra note 117.
273
Id.; see also Berenson, supra note 127.
Fibromyalgia is a real disease. Or so says Pfizer in a new television advertising campaign for Lyrica, the first medicine approved to treat the pain condition, whose very existence is questioned by some doctors. . . . Many of its
sufferers are afflicted by other similarly nebulous conditions, like irritable
bowel syndrome.
Id.
274
Facing Fibromyalgia, Finding Hope, supra note 117.
275
Although the link for www.fibrohope.org at the end of the commercial no longer exists, the first link on a Google search of “fibromyalgia and Pfizer” reveals
www.fibrocenter.com, which leads to a similar website.
See FIBROCENTER,
http://www.fibrocenter.com (last visited Feb. 4, 2012).
276
It is possible that this promotion is misbranded. See U.S. FOOD AND DRUG ADMIN.,
supra note 156, at 6 (“If a disease awareness or help-seeking piece and a reminder advertisement are presented in a manner that causes their messages to be linked together by the
audience, the failure of the combined communication to include the risk [information] . . .
would cause the advertised product to be misbranded.”).
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As demonstrated by these examples, disease-branding and drugmongering in the form of DTC advertising intend to make consumers believe that they suffer from serious medical conditions. Consequently, there
seems to be sufficient evidence to conclude that DTC advertising campaigns could constitute outrageous conduct.
2.

Negligent Infliction of Emotional Distress (NIED)
277

If the iatrogenic effects from taking the medication are considered,
then a plaintiff may have a successful argument for the physical impact or
278
injury necessary to establish a prima facie case of NIED. There is no recovery in tort for NIED unless the plaintiff falls within a recoverypermitting category; the relevant one for the test case is emotional harm
279
that accompanies a physical impact or injury.
Thus, the law permits a
plaintiff to recover for emotional distress when the plaintiff sustains a phys280
ical injury that results from a defendant’s negligence.
In Metro-North Commuter Railroad Co. v. Buckley, the plaintiff argued that he suffered severe emotional distress from fear of developing
cancer after he was negligently exposed to excessive amounts of asbes281
tos.
The physical contact with asbestos did not amount to physical impact sufficient for an NIED claim because the plaintiff was asymptomat282
ic.
In addition, the Supreme Court explained that a “‘physical
impact’ . . . does not include a simple physical contact with a substance that
might cause a disease at a substantially later time—where that substance, or
related circumstance, threatens no harm other than that disease-related

277

Dr. Jutel explains the dangers of iatrogenic effects as follows:
The expansion of diagnostic categories is not without risk and can have severe iatrogenic results. The concordant treatment which accompanies a diagnosis may expose an individual to undesirable, or unintended, secondary
effects. The medicalisation of shyness which results in the diagnoses of Social Phobia, Social Anxiety Disorder and Avoidant Personality Disorder, as
one example, encourages patients to request, and doctors to recommend, the
use of pharmaceutical remedies, some of which have led to reports of devastating side effects.
Jutel, supra note 43, at 286.
278
The side effects would be insufficient for a products liability claim, so this cause of
action is not considered in this Comment. Moreover, the argument is not related to the
product itself because the plaintiff would not be alleging a failure to warn, design defect, or
manufacturing defect. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PRODUCTS LIABILITY § 6
(1998).
279
Metro-N. Commuter R.R. Co. v. Buckley, 521 U.S. 424, 430 (1997).
280
Id.
281
Id. at 427. Although Buckley arose under the Federal Employer’s Liability Act, the
Court relied on common-law tort principles, see id. at 429, thus making the analysis relevant
and applicable for our test case.
282
Id. at 432.

688

SETON HALL LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 42:643

283

risk.” Accordingly, the rule gleaned from Buckley is that the mere exposure to deleterious substances or the possible risk of developing a disease
are insufficient for an NIED claim; rather, some sort of actual physical injury is required.
In Michtavi, the court noted that under the Federal Tort Claims Act
(FTCA), a prisoner-plaintiff must suffer “less-than-significant-but-morethan-de minimis physical injury” before a civil action can be brought for
284
mental distress.
The plaintiff did not allege that the prison officials
physically harmed him; rather, the plaintiff merely alleged that the prison
officials were negligent in allowing fellow inmates to succeed in their
285
schemes to defraud him. Thus, the court concluded that the FTCA claim
failed because “the fact that [plaintiff’s] mental condition is treated with
medication does not mean these emotional problems are physical injury. . . . [T]he fact that [the plaintiff] physically takes medication, or that the
medication works on his physical body, does not mean that the medication
286
is treating physical injury.”
Although taking medication for emotional problems does not mean
that the medication is treating a physical injury, the iatrogenic effects of the
treatment may result in physical injury. This distinction is relevant to remove the test case from the Michtavi rule. Thus, although the plaintiff in
this Comment’s test case is not taking the drug for emotional distress, a
physical injury may arise as an unintended consequence (side effect) of the
pharmaceutical treatment. Accordingly, the physical effect of the drug
could become, in essence, the physical impact element for the cause of action.
But in Pennsylvania, for example, a plaintiff alleging an NIED claim
287
“must suffer immediate and substantial physical harm.”
In the test case,
this contemporaneous element is missing because the physical impact of
the side effect occurs after the plaintiff experiences emotional distress upon
being subjected to the disease-branding and drug-mongering campaign.
Logically, a second bout of emotional distress could accompany the physical symptoms of suffering from side effects, but this would remove the
analysis from the disease-branding and drug-mongering scenario. Because
283

Id. at 430.
Michtavi v. United States, No. 4:07-CV-0628, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 18926, at *12
(M.D. Pa. Mar. 4, 2009), aff’d, 345 F. App’x. 727 (3d Cir. 2009). Although this case arose
under the FTCA, the court applied the substantive law of the state where the act occurred.
Id.; see 28 U.S.C. § 1346(b)(1). Thus, the discussion of a physical-injury requirement is
analogous to the test case for NIED because it explains that receiving pharmaceutical treatment for a mental disorder does not establish that the plaintiff has suffered a physical injury.
285
Michtavi, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 18926, at *14-15.
286
Id. at *15.
287
Doe v. Phila. Cmty. Health Alts. AIDS Task Force, 745 A.2d 25, 28 (Pa. Super. Ct.
2000).
284
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the second bout of emotional distress would be proximately caused by the
side effects, the claim arising in this case would be an emotional distress
288
claim accompanying a products-liability case.
Thus, to correctly isolate
and define disease-branding and drug-mongering as the causative factors,
one has to assume that the initial bout of emotional distress was proximately caused by, and directly preceded by, the advertising campaign. But if
this were the case, then the physical injury element necessary for the NIED
claim could not be satisfied due to lack of contemporaneousness: the emotional distress would have preceded the physical injury, which is caused by
the drug’s side effects. Therefore, it seems that an NIED cause of action
would likely fail.
Furthermore, the “learned intermediary doctrine” might provide a defense to pharmaceutical company liability. According to this doctrine,
289
which almost every jurisdiction has adopted, pharmaceutical companies
have a duty to warn the physician, rather than the consumer as the end user,
290
of a prescription drug’s side effects through adequate labeling.
If the
warning is adequate, then the drug company essentially delegates its duty
291
to warn to the physician and shields itself from liability.
But New Jersey, for example, does not apply the learned intermediary
doctrine to drug companies when they engage in mass-marketing of drugs
because the premises on which the doctrine relies are absent in the DTC
292
advertising context. In Perez v. Wyeth Laboratories Inc., the New Jersey
Supreme Court held that the learned intermediary doctrine will not apply
when a prescription drug manufacturer uses DTC advertising to market its
293
drug; instead, drug companies have a duty to warn patients directly and
cannot rely on the prescribing physician’s knowledge and position of authority to convey warnings. Essentially, the court explained that “[w]hen
288

See supra note 278 (discussing a product liability claim).
See Garbutt & Hofmann, supra note 84, at 273. But see Perez v. Wyeth Labs. Inc.,
734 A.2d 1245 (N.J. 1999) (refusing to shield drug companies from liability based on the
“learned intermediary doctrine” in the context of mass-marketed drugs through DTC advertising).
290
Diane Schmauder Kane, Annotation, Construction and Application of LearnedIntermediary Doctrine, 57 A.L.R.5th 1 (1998).
291
See, e.g., Pustejovsky v. PLIVA, Inc., 623 F.3d 271, 276 (5th Cir. 2010) (“Under the
doctrine, the manufacturer may rely on the doctor—the learned intermediary—to pass on its
warnings. Thus, so long as the drug manufacturer properly warns a prescribing physician of
the dangerous propensities of its product, the manufacturer is excused from warning each
patient who receives the drug.”).
292
Perez, 734 A.2d at 1255.
293
Id. at 1257; see also In re Norplant Contraceptive Prods. Liab. Litig., 215 F. Supp. 2d
795, 811–12 (E.D. Tex. 2002) (analyzing Perez). See generally Garbutt & Hofmann, supra
note 84, at 273. (“[DTC advertising] essentially bypasses the ‘intermediary’ . . . . Thus, the
role of the physician . . . is greatly diminished and pharmaceutical companies should not be
able to benefit from the learned intermediary doctrine.”).
289
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mass marketing of prescription drugs seeks to influence a patient’s choice
of a drug, a pharmaceutical manufacturer that makes direct claims to consumers . . . should not be unqualifiedly relieved of a duty to provide proper
294
warnings of the dangers or side effects of the product.”
Although Perez concerns a failure-to-warn claim, the fact that the
learned intermediary doctrine may not apply to DTC advertising is relevant
to an NIED claim based on disease-branding and drug-mongering. In New
Jersey, the learned intermediary doctrine would probably not apply in a
claim for NIED premised on disease-branding and drug-mongering; however, in any other jurisdiction, the doctrine would most likely shield drug
295
companies from liability.
Furthermore, the element of “physical impact” in the NIED context
raises an interesting and troublesome question as to the proper defendant.
The drug company’s disease-branding and drug-mongering caused the
emotional distress and the drug caused the injury, but the company was not
negligent in providing the plaintiff with the injury-causing drug. Thus, in
the test case, it seems that the plaintiff’s emotional distress cannot be attributed to a drug company’s negligent conduct. The drug company is not
liable for negligence for the physical injury sustained by the plaintiff because the plaintiff autonomously purchased and ingested a drug that the
FDA approved as safe and effective, and the physical injury (side effect)
occurred afterward. Thus, the only potential party whose negligent conduct
caused a physical injury to the plaintiff would be the treating physician.
Consequently, the plaintiff may have an alternative cause of action for
medical malpractice for wrongful diagnosis or negligent prescribing practices.
3. Medical Malpractice
A plaintiff alleging medical malpractice premised on a theory of negligent diagnosis and treatment must establish four elements: duty, breach,
296
causation, and damages. The breach element may be satisfied if the doctor’s “actions demonstrate either a lack of skill or care, or failure to give

294

Perez, 734 A.2d at 1247.
New Jersey seems to be the only jurisdiction to recognize a DTC-advertising exception to the learned intermediary doctrine. See Beale v. Biomet, Inc., 492 F. Supp. 2d 1360,
1376–77 (S.D. Fla. 2007) (“While the Perez court found that the law should be changing in
response to changes in marketing strategies by drug manufacturers, New Jersey is the only
state to have done so. It is now eight years since Perez was decided, and no other state has
followed suit.”). But see Centocor, Inc. v. Hamilton, 310 S.W.3d 476, 508 (Tex. App. 2010)
(“[T]he theoretical underpinnings of the ‘learned intermediary’ doctrine do not apply when a
drug manufacturer directly markets to its consumers, the patients.”), review granted (Aug.
11, 2011).
296
See 22 FRUMER & FRIEDMAN, supra note 185, § 106.02.
295
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297

careful and proper attention to his patient.”
Failure to consider a differ298
ential diagnosis may violate the standard of care and establish breach, as
it provides evidence of the physician’s lack of proper attention to the pa299
tient’s case. This is because
[a]n incorrect diagnosis of a patient’s condition may produce harmful
results either by inducing the patient to forgo the proper treatment
which would have corrected the illness, or by leading the defendant to
give treatment which is harmful in and of itself, aside from the failure
300
to treat the condition with which the plaintiff is actually afflicted.

In Wojton v. United States, for example, the plaintiff alleged four acts of
negligence against the Veterans Administration for: (1) wrongful diagnosis
of schizophrenia, (2) wrongful prescribing of schizophrenia medication, (3)
301
failure to diagnose PTSD, and (4) failure to prescribe PTSD medication.
Although neither the plaintiff nor the court addressed these claims in terms
of failure to consider a differential diagnosis, the diagnostic criteria for the302
se mental disorders suggest that the inference is clear.
Misdiagnosing
these two disorders is common due to the subjective experience of hallucinations.
Analogously, because of the subjective diagnostic criteria of FMS and
IBS, a medical malpractice claim could arise if the physician negligently
failed to consider the vast array of differential diagnoses for these disorders. A differential diagnosis is critical when evaluating FMS because
“[t]here are no tests and no combination of symptoms and signs that signify
303
without doubt that a patient has fibromyalgia.”
Thus, “a number of distinctive disorders may share a few or several signs and symptoms with fi-

297

Heimlicher v. Steele, 615 F. Supp. 2d 884, 910 (N.D. Iowa 2009).
Differential diagnosis is “[t]he method of distinguishing between two or more diseases having similar symptoms by carefully comparing and evaluating the few dissimilar characteristics and signs, and thus making a final diagnosis.” 2-D ATTORNEYS’ DICTIONARY OF
MEDICINE D-34474 (2009).
299
E.g., Trowbridge v. United States, 703 F. Supp. 2d 1129, 1142 (D. Idaho 2010) (holding that a doctor breached the standard of care in formulating differential diagnoses and
treatment plans).
300
W.E. Shipley, Annotation, Proximate Cause in Malpractice Cases, 13 A.L.R.2d 11
(2008).
301
199 F. Supp. 2d 722, 724 (D. Ohio 2002).
302
See DSM-IV-TR, 2000, supra note 3, at 467 (“Flashbacks in Posttraumatic Stress
Disorder must be distinguished from illusions, hallucinations, and other perceptual disturbances that may occur in Schizophrenia . . . .”); 2 DAVID L. FAIGMAN ET AL. MODERN
SCIENTIFIC EVIDENCE: THE LAW AND SCIENCE OF EXPERT TESTIMONY § 9:33 (2011–12) (noting that flashbacks are the “the PTSD symptoms . . . [that] appear to involve a level of reality distortion comparable to that in schizophrenia”).
303
David A. Cramer, Fibroymalgia—Clinical Features and Diagnosis, in 6 ATTORNEYS’
TEXTBOOK OF MEDICINE 25.30, 25.30 (Roscoe N. Gray & Louise J. Gordy eds., 3d ed.,
2011).
298
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304

bromyalgia, sometimes making a distinction very difficult.”
For example, hypothyroidism may cause fatigue and widespread soft tissue tender305
ness and thus can masquerade as fibromyalgia.
An article on the differential diagnosis of fibromyalgia notes that
[t]he multiple symptoms of fibromyalgia often overlap with those of related disorders and may further complicate the diagnosis. One of the
most challenging diagnostic dilemmas that clinicians face is distinguishing fibromyalgia from other central pain disorders (e.g., irritable
bowel syndrome, chronic fatigue syndrome, migraine) . . . . To date,
there is no “gold standard” for diagnosing fibromyalgia. Until a better
clinical case definition of fibromyalgia exists, all diagnostic criteria
should be interpreted with caution, considered rudimentary, and subject
306
to modification.

Similarly, “[b]ecause there are usually no physical signs to definitively diagnose irritable bowel syndrome, diagnosis is often a process of elimina307
tion.” Differential diagnoses for IBS include ulcerative colitis, diverticu308
litis, and Crohn’s disease.
In addition, celiac disease and lactose
309
intolerance may cause signs and symptoms similar to IBS.
Thus, one could imagine a cause of action parallel to Wojton for FMS
or IBS: (1) wrongful diagnosis of FMS or IBS, (2) wrongful prescribing of
Lyrica or Zelnorm, (3) failure to diagnose, for example, hypothyroidism or
Crohn’s disease, and (4) failure to prescribe drugs for these conditions. A
patient presenting with gastrointestinal complaints who self-diagnoses as
having IBS and seeks a prescription for Zelnorm (based on the cumulative
impact of a disease-mongering campaign), may in fact have a number of
other diseases. If the doctor fails to consider these differential diagnoses,
fails to order appropriate tests, and thereby wrongfully diagnoses IBS, the
doctor may be liable for malpractice if the patient suffers adverse reactions
to Zelnorm.
Medical malpractice lawsuits could be a weapon against diseasebranding and drug-mongering, but they only work in individual cases
against individual doctors. Although individual incidents may be remedied
through medical malpractice cases, this would not produce systemic change
304

Id. at 25.37.
Id.
306
D.L. Goldenberg, Diagnosis and Differential Diagnosis of Fibromyalgia, 122 AM. J.
MED. (12 Supp.) S14, S14 (2009).
307
Irritable Bowel Syndrome—Tests and Diagnoses, MAYO CLINIC (July 29, 2011),
http://www.mayoclinic.com/health/irritable-bowel-syndrome/DS00106/DSECTION=testsand-diagnosis [hereinafter Irritable Bowel Syndrome—Tests and Diagnoses].
308
3 ATTORNEYS’ DICTIONARY OF MEDICINE I-62839 (2009); see also Hans Tester, Ulcerative Colitis, in 16 ATTORNEYS’ TEXTBOOK OF MEDICINE, supra note 303, at 231.50,
231.54(3).
309
Irritable Bowel Syndrome–Tests and Diagnoses, supra note 307.
305
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in pharmaceutical companies’ promotion of their products. And while successful medical malpractice claims create precedent for which other victims
of disease-branding and drug-mongering could rely, this would probably
only affect doctors’ diagnostic procedures rather than their prescribing habits. In other words, when patients complain of disease-branded symptoms,
physicians would be more likely to consider differential diagnoses, rather
than refuse to prescribe a drug and facilitate the drug-mongering. Thus,
any attempt to “starve the pharmaceutical beast” by suing doctors in an effort to prevent drug overprescribing would likely fail to address the institutionalized practice of DTC advertising central to disease-branding and
drug-mongering campaigns.
Ultimately, it seems possible to file a complaint for IIED based on the
alleged outrageousness of DTC advertising campaigns, and while the case
may reach adjudication on the merits, it seems insufficient to significantly
alter pharmaceutical promotional practices. In addition, an NIED claim
would probably fail due to the lack of contemporaneousness between emotional distress and injury; also the learned intermediary doctrine would
pose a formidable defense to an NIED case. Finally, medical malpractice
claims seem to be a viable, although still insufficient, option that could circuitously influence how pharmaceutical companies advertise. Notwithstanding the potential for establishing precedent, even if a test case is won
and affirmed on appeal, these litigious retrospective strategies would ultimately be ineffective at producing real, systemic change in diseasebranding and drug-mongering promotional practices. Therefore, the critics
of these practices should look to the legislative arena to combat the specific
pharmaceutical promotional strategies that they consider particularly egregious and detrimental to public health. Legislative reform, as a prospective
remedy, can address the practices on a comprehensive, collaborative, and
systemic level, without resorting to the expensive, time-consuming, and
highly-particularized adversarial process.
C. Legislative Prescriptions for Reform: Understanding and
Promoting “Academic Detailing”
Rather than relying on the inherently retrospective remedy of litiga310
tion, it is possible to construct prospective policy solutions.
For exam310

Id.

Cf. Lambdin, supra note 240, at 170–71.
While it may ultimately be out of the hands of the courts and the FDA to impose harsher restrictions on direct-to-consumer advertising, if the public continues to hear statements [warning how DTC marketing has led to irresponsible prescribing practices that jeopardize patient safety], it is highly likely that
it will be able to initiate reform on its own, as the pendulum of public perception swings from one of acceptance to suspicion in the realm of direct-toconsumer advertising.
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ple, educating doctors about drug-mongering and disease-branding, through
a process called “academic detailing,” could curb the arguably detrimental
311
effects of these advertising practices.
Academic detailing is the process
by which non-profit entities send trained healthcare professionals to physi312
cians’ offices to educate them about drugs and prescribing practices.
Essentially, qualified experts, “[u]sing some of the techniques of behavioral
science that drug reps use, but without the financial incentives of gifts and
samples,” train doctors about drug-treatment options and prescribing prac313
tices.
The most important techniques of academic detailing include “conducting interviews to investigate baseline knowledge and motivations for
current prescribing patterns . . . [and] establishing credibility through a respected organizational identity, referencing authoritative and unbiased
sources of information, and presenting both sides of controversial is314
sues.”
Accordingly, academic detailing “combat[s] pharmaceutical sales
reps[’] influence on prescribing, and help[s] get doctors the best evi315
dence—without the sales pitch.”
Because DTC advertising gives consumers increased access to information, academic detailing will allow doctors to regain their medical authority by becoming knowledgeable about
pharmaceutical promotional practices in an effort to combat the effects of
316
DTC advertising on patients.
317
Doctors should be aware of disease-branding and drug-mongering.
They “should be wary of exaggerated claims and should place the same
amount of scrutiny on ads for prescription drugs as [they] would on any

311
But see Iona Heath, Combating Disease Mongering: Daunting but Nonetheless Essential,
3
PLOS
MED.
448,
448
(2006),
available
at
http://www.plosmedicine.org/article/info%3Adoi%2F10.1371%2Fjournal.pmed.0030146
(“The challenges of combating the current epidemic of disease mongering is daunting, and
anyone looking for ready solutions should read no further.”).
312
Susan Poser, Unlabeled Drug Samples and the Learned Intermediary: The Case for
Drug Company Liability Without Preemption, 62 FOOD & DRUG L.J. 653, 691–92 (2007);
see also Academic Detailing and the Odds at Agincourt, POSTSCRIPT BLOG (Apr. 22, 2010,
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other advertisement.” Academic detailing would thus provide physicians
with the tools to recognize drug-seeking behavior associated with diseasebranding and drug-mongering strategies. By making doctors aware of these promotional practices, and reiterating the importance of differential diagnoses and alternative treatment options, academic detailing would be an
effective tool to combat these practices. Moreover, open communication
between physicians and patients, both with full knowledge of diseasebranding and drug-mongering practices, would expose the manipulative effects of these practices and allow for more rational prescription drug use.
In fact, research suggests that academic detailing is an effective way to
counteract the influence of pharmaceutical promotional practices and re319
duce inappropriate prescribing.
For example, one study published in the
New England Journal of Medicine concluded that “[a]cademically based
‘detailing’ may represent a useful and cost-effective way to improve the
320
quality of drug-therapy decisions and reduce unnecessary expenditures.”
Growing interest in academic detailing “is part of a growing awareness that pharmaceutical marketing has the potential to interfere with safe
prescribing and patient care—and a broader effort to make sure it
321
doesn’t.”
The problems associated with drug marketing have captured
Congress’s attention and inspired it to act. The Independent Drug Education and Outreach Act (IDEA), a bill that was introduced in the House of
Representatives and Senate but died in committee, would have provided
“grants or contracts for prescription drug education and outreach for
322
healthcare providers and their patients.”
The relevant section of the act
would have required the Secretary of Health and Human Services to award
contracts to “eligible entities for the development and implementation of
programs to appropriately train and deploy healthcare professionals to educate physicians and other drug prescribers concerning the relative safety,
relative effectiveness, and relative cost of prescription drugs and their al323
ternatives.”

318
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The bill was premised on the notion that “[o]ffice calls work. That’s
why they are the preferred sales tactic of industry. So it makes sense that
governments and others who actually foot the cost of prescription drugs
should adopt the same tactic, albeit with the goal of encouraging the use of
324
the best, safest, most cost-effective drugs.”
Therefore, IDEA should be
reintroduced, and ultimately enacted into law, as a prospective remedy for
the detrimental effects of disease-branding and drug-mongering. The bill
could be amended to also create advisory committees composed of sociology, marketing, and psychology experts to help construct academicdetailing protocols and public-health outreach programs. These protocols
and programs would facilitate the academic detailer’s role in explaining to
doctors and patients the power of medicalization—how social forces impact the definition of diseases, how disease is thus socially constructed, and
how medicalization can be influenced by aggressive promotional practices.
The advisory committee recommendations could clarify the sociology-ofhealth critique of disease-branding and drug-mongering, and the increased
knowledge of this phenomenon would yield a stronger defense arsenal for
both prescribing physicians and patients.
Ultimately, this legislative prescription would not alter the FDA’s
regulatory authority over DTC advertising and would leave the FD&C Act
325
and associated regulations intact, but would provide an alternative educational method of combating the deleterious effects of otherwise-legal advertising and promotional practices.
V. CONCLUSION
The problems of disease-branding and drug-mongering have become
rampant in our society, though at this juncture it is uncontested that they do
not, as a general matter, violate any existing laws. These phenomena have
surfaced as a result of relatively relaxed FDA regulation of DTC advertising. Drug companies have recognized the utility of socially constructing
diseases and have employed this technique into effective advertising practices. It might be possible to bring a cause of action against drug companies and, somewhat derivatively, against prescribing physicians for these
practices, but it seems that the most likely way to effect change in this area
of law would be through legislation and education.
The likelihood of success for an IIED claim is improbable, and an
NIED claim would most likely fail for a variety of reasons including the
lack of contemporaneousness with distress and injury and the learned intermediary doctrine defense. Furthermore, while medical malpractice
324
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325
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claims against prescribing physicians for wrongful diagnosis might be successful on an individual basis, they would not bring about any substantial
changes in drug-company advertising practices. Thus, critics of diseasebranding and drug-mongering seem to be left without an effective legal
remedy, and any such remedy would certainly not lead to, or result in,
overhaul in a way that legislation could.
Therefore, because the promotional practices are legal and generally
do not rise to the level of tortious conduct, critics of disease-branding and
drug-mongering ought to consider legislative reform efforts to address
pharmaceutical promotional practices and ameliorate their public health effects. Enhancing physicians and consumers’ knowledge would enable
them to recognize disease-branding and drug-mongering and cope better
with the torrent of such practices. Instituting academic-detailing programs
would combat these practices in a systemic and non-litigious way by counteracting the effects of DTC advertising on consumer demand and physician prescribing habits.
Although these promotional practices will probably never go away, it
is certainly possible for the pharmaceutical industry, the FDA, and critics
alike to coexist more harmoniously. If these relevant stakeholders were
aware of the existing competing economic and public-health goals, then
educated doctors and consumers could select which drugs are medically
necessary, rather than being persuaded by the industry’s disease-branding
and drug-mongering practices.

